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REGULATION BY THIRD-PARTY 
VERIFICATION 
Lesley K. McAllister* 
Abstract: This Article proposes greater governmental reliance on private 
auditors to enhance the achievement of regulatory objectives. Regulatory 
failure is a growing problem as governmental agencies lack resources to 
adequately monitor and detect noncompliance. Third-party verification 
partially privatizes the regulatory function by requiring regulated entities 
to hire independent third parties to verify compliance data and make 
compliance determinations. As a type of privatization, third-party verifica-
tion presents both opportunities and potential problems. The key issue, as 
in other forms of public-private governance, is ensuring that accountability 
and other public values are protected when private actors perform func-
tions that are fundamentally public. This Article argues that, as third-party 
verification is incorporated into regulatory frameworks, it must be care-
fully regulated itself. Regulatory agencies must assume the role of “audit-
ing the auditors” through making and enforcing rules that govern who 
can serve as a verifier, how regulated entities select verifiers, and how veri-
fications are performed. With well-designed rules and strong governmen-
tal oversight, third-party verification has the potential to cost-effectively 
improve the implementation of social regulation. 
Introduction 
 Regulatory failure makes headlines. Outbreaks of food borne ill-
ness show that regulators have failed to act on information they have or 
should have had about poor food safety practices.1 Investigative report-
ing on water pollution enforcement reveals that, although more than 
half of polluters are significantly out of compliance, fewer than three 
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and Society Association Annual Meeting for their helpful comments. 
1 See Michael Moss, Peanut Case Shows Holes in Food Safety Net, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2010, 
at A1; Rory Harrington, FDA Failed over Salmonella Outbreak, Says New Chief, FoodNaviga-
tor-USA.com (May 27, 2009), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Legislation/FDA-failed-
over-salmonella-outbreak-says-new-chief. 
1 
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percent of violations result in fines or other sanctions.2 From the na-
tion’s largest oil spill, we have learned that the agency responsible for 
regulating offshore drilling failed to inspect as frequently as legally re-
quired.3 
 The explanation is often the same: regulatory agencies lack the 
capacity to adequately implement and enforce the law.4 Most basically, 
there are not enough inspectors or resources to perform the basic task 
of detecting violations. For example, of the 9.1 million food shipments 
imported into the United States in 2006, the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA) inspected only 115,000 shipments and sent only 20,000 
samples for laboratory analysis.5 Facilities regulated under the Clean 
Water Act might only be inspected once every few years, and evidence 
suggests that noncompliance is the norm rather than the exception.6 
Continuing and growing shortfalls in federal and state budgets make 
change to this status quo unlikely. 
 Third-party verification, the regulatory approach described and 
analyzed in this Article, seems appropriate for an era of growing regula-
tory demands and diminishing governmental resources. As used here-
in, the term “third party” refers to an external private auditor or con-
sultant who is paid by the regulated entity.7 “Third-party verification,” 
in turn, denotes a system in which governmental agencies rely on these 
third parties to verify regulatory compliance.8 With third-party verifica-
tion, regulated entities are required to contract with a “verifier” or “ve-
rification body” to make a regulatory compliance determination.9 The 
                                                                                                                      
2 Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
13, 2009, at A1. 
3 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 82–
85 (2011). 
4 See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First Century: 
Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 775, 776 & n.10 (2004) (noting 
that many state governments lack the resources necessary to maintain water quality control 
programs). 
5 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew T. Guzman, Importers as Regulators: Product Safety in 
a Globalized World, in Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy 
193, 197–98 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009). 
6 Rechtschaffen, supra note 4, at 781–83; James Salzman et al., Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 
Wyo. L. Rev. 253, 283–84 (2002). 
7 The term “third party” is defined and used here as it is in the literature on third-
party certification. See infra notes 255–259 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
9 In existing regulatory programs, “verification body” tends to be used to refer to a 
company or organization, while “verifier” refers to an individual. In this Article the two 
terms will generally be used interchangeably. 
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verifiers are generally private entities that have been approved, or “ac-
credited,” to perform this task by the government or by a government-
approved “accreditation body.” Third-party verification may substitute 
for direct compliance monitoring by the governmental agency. 
 Third-party verification has already been incorporated into climate 
change and food safety regulatory frameworks, and it has potentially 
broad application across many fields of social regulation.10 The market-
based regulatory approaches that have been used in climate change 
regulation, including emissions trading and taxation schemes, are high-
ly dependent on reliable compliance data. Similarly, the global struc-
ture of production chains for food, drugs, and other consumer prod-
ucts makes compliance difficult to ascertain by traditional routes. In 
these situations, third-party verification has become a regulatory ap-
proach of choice. And it is not just these new areas of regulation that 
would benefit from more reliable information and greater compli-
ance.11 Third-party verification could be used more broadly in efforts 
to enhance regulatory compliance and avert regulatory failure. 
                                                                                                                     
 Nonetheless, cautionary tales abound. Requiring annual reports 
that must be certified by independent accountants, financial regulation 
has relied extensively on a system much like third-party verification.12 
Hired by the companies they audit, auditors have sometimes lacked 
independence and contributed to such financial disasters as the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1990s and the collapse of Enron in the early 
2000s.13 In addition, third-party verification closely resembles third-party 
 
 
10 See infra notes 25–72 and accompanying text (describing how third-party verification 
is already incorporated into regulatory regimes); see also Eugene Bardach, Social Regulation 
as a Generic Policy Instrument, in Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Ac-
tion 197, 198 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 1989) (distinguishing social and economic regula-
tion); Peter J. May, Social Regulation, in The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New 
Governance 156, 161 box 5-1 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (listing the original dates of 
the enactment of “Major Social Regulatory Laws” in the United States); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Administrative Substance, 1991 Duke L.J. 607, 609 (identifying health, safety, broadcasting, 
discrimination, and the environment as areas of social regulation and distinguishing social 
regulation from economic regulation). 
11 Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire Straits: There Is 
No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 55, 86 (2010). 
12 Mark W. Olson, Former Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Financial Re-
porting Council Ken Spencer Memorial Lecture: The Audit Profession and the Evolution to 
Independent Oversight (Mar. 11, 2009), http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/0311 
2009_OlsonFinancialReportingCouncil.aspx (arguing that independent audits are an impor-
tant aspect of the modern securities law regime). 
13 See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors’ Incentives, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 989, 990 
(2003) (stating that the basic problem afflicting the accounting industry is that “account-
ing firms work for the companies they audit”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Catastrophic Financial 
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certification, used in voluntary schemes to substantiate marketing claims 
about, for example, the sustainability of forest products or the legality 
of labor practices in foreign manufacturing plants.14 Some scholars 
have questioned the competence and accountability of the third-party 
certifiers in voluntary certification schemes.15 
 Third-party verification represents a partial privatization of the 
public function of enforcing regulatory law.16 It is a form of “public-
private governance” in which private actors play critical roles in spheres 
that are commonly viewed as governmental in nature.17 Scholars have 
recognized that while there are “longstanding and complex interac-
tions” between public and private actors, recent privatization trends 
raise important new questions.18 On the one hand, the new privatiza-
tion may jeopardize the fulfillment of public purposes and commit-
ments; on the other, it may enable innovation, efficiency, and quality in 
the provision of governmental services.19 Like other forms of public-
private governance, the growing use of third-party verification in regu-
latory implementation embodies this tension. 
                                                                                                                      
Failures: Enron and More, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 423, 423–25 (2005) (discussing questionable 
accounting and questionable accountants in recent catastrophic financial collapses). 
14 On voluntary certification schemes, see infra notes 98–137 and accompanying text. 
Although this Article focuses on third-party verification in the context of mandatory gov-
ernmental regulation, many of its observations and arguments also apply to third-party 
certification in voluntary programs. 
15 See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The 
Case of Forestry, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 47, 71–72 (2006); Dara O’Rourke, Monitoring the Moni-
tors: A Critique of Corporate Third-Party Labour Monitoring, in Corporate Responsibility and 
Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy 196, 197 (Rhys Jenkins et 
al. eds., 2002). 
16 Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 
Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1230 (2003) (defining privatization to include “the range of efforts by 
governments to move public functions into private hands and to use market-style competi-
tion”); see also Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1285, 1286–87 (2003) (discussing various forms of privatization). 
17 William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in Government 
by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy 23, 23–25 ( Jody Freeman & 
Martha Minow eds., 2009) (describing public-private governance and placing it in histori-
cal context). 
18 Minow, supra note 16, at 1229–30; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart 
Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 913, 916 (2007) 
[hereinafter Vandenbergh, New Wal-Mart] (analyzing private contracting as a new form of 
governance); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 
2029, 2038 (2005) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private Life] (discussing the roles of private 
actors in the principal functions traditionally assigned to public agencies). 
19 Minow, supra note 16, at 1242–46; see Freeman, supra note 16, at 1295–98; Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 549 (2000). 
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 Through analysis of third-party verification, this Article sets forth a 
promising new approach to regulatory implementation that holds im-
portant lessons for public-private governance. Third-party verification 
has the potential to harness private resources in a way that significantly 
enhances regulatory compliance. To achieve this end, however, gov-
ernment must be able and willing to create regulatory structures that 
protect and promote public goals. The regulatory structures recom-
mended here, such as strong standards for the accreditation of private 
actors and their performance, provide an exemplary framework for 
other types of public-private partnerships in which private actors per-
form traditionally public functions. 
 Part I of this Article introduces third-party verification with a dis-
cussion of regulatory programs in which it is used.20 Part II identifies 
reasons to support the incorporation of third-party verification into so-
cial regulation.21 These reasons are similar to the reasons supporting 
privatization in other contexts: to tap private resources and expertise, 
improve governmental performance, and cut governmental costs.22 
Part III identifies reasons for concern about third-party verification, 
which include not only the challenge of maintaining public account-
ability when private actors play public roles but also potential problems 
of verifier independence, verifier competence, and cost.23 Part IV sets 
forth recommendations for how third-party verification systems should 
be structured and regulated to enable them to effectively serve public 
purposes.24 
I. Regulation by Third-Party Verification 
 In the final decades of the twentieth century, a large body of social 
regulation emerged in the United States to prevent and address social 
harms, particularly harms to the environment, human health, and safe-
ty. In traditional social regulation, governmental enforcement agents 
monitor the behavior of regulated entities to detect noncompliance 
with rules and assess sanctions at their discretion.25 In regulation by 
third-party verification, independent verifiers provide an expert opin-
ion to the regulatory agency concerning whether the compliance in-
formation provided by a regulated entity is accurate and supports a 
                                                                                                                      
20 See infra notes 25–72 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 73–191 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 73–191 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 192–314 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 315–427 and accompanying text. 
25 See Bardach, supra note 10, at 197. 
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finding that the regulated entity is in compliance.26 The government 
retains the authority to exercise oversight and apply sanctions for non-
compliance.27 
 Several prominent examples of the regulatory use of third-party 
verification have emerged in the past several years.28 As described in 
this Part, third-party verification is used in mandatory greenhouse gas 
reporting programs in Europe, California, and Massachusetts. Third-
party verification is also slated to play an important role in the FDA’s 
regulation of food imports under the U.S. Food Safety Modernization 
Act of 2011.29 Notably, regulatory approaches bearing many similarities 
to third-party verification have long been used in a variety of less visible 
regulatory programs. 
A. Climate Change Regulation 
 Third-party verification has been widely incorporated into climate 
change regulation. Third-party verification is required of regulated en-
tities reporting greenhouse gas emissions under the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the California Global Warming 
Solutions Act,30 and the Massachusetts Climate Protection and Green 
Economy Act.31 Under each of these programs, regulated entities must 
contract with a private verification firm that is responsible for reviewing 
the entity’s greenhouse gas emissions report and submitting to the gov-
ernment a determination as to whether the report is accurate and oth-
                                                                                                                      
26 Cf. Clark C. Havighurst, Foreword: The Place of Private Accrediting Among the Instruments 
of Government, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1994, at 1, 2 (defining accreditation as 
“the formal expression by a private body of an authoritative opinion concerning the ac-
ceptability, under objective quality standards fairly applied, of the services rendered by a 
particular institutional provider”). 
27 See Freeman, supra note 16, at 1326 n.177 (noting, in a discussion of government ac-
countability, that the government is capable of imposing sanctions in a third-party verifica-
tion scheme). 
28 See infra notes 30–72 and accompanying text. 
29 Michael R. Taylor, Deputy Comm’r for Foods, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Remarks 
at the China International Food Safety and Quality Conference and Expo, Implementa-
tion of the U.S. Food Safety Modernization Act: Building a Partnership for Prevention 
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/ucm278215.htm. 
30 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Cal. Health & Safety Code 
§§ 38500–38599 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
31 Climate Protection and Green Economy Act of 2008, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, 
§§ 1–9 (2008 & Supp. 2009). The Climate Protection and Green Economy Act (“CPGEA”) 
is contained within the Global Warming Solutions Act. Global Warming Solutions Act, 
2008 Mass. Acts 298 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21); see 
Ken Kimmell & Laurie Burt, Massachusetts Takes on Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & 
Pol’y 295, 302–04 (2009). 
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erwise in conformity with the law. Each of these regulatory frameworks 
also has procedures for accrediting the third-party verifiers and guid-
ance for how the verification is to be performed. 
 The EU ETS, initiated in 2005, regulates the carbon dioxide emis-
sions of over 11,000 stationary sources in thirty European states.32 Re-
sponsible for ensuring the accuracy of the EU ETS emissions reports 
submitted annually by each source, member states have the authority to 
require that sources use third-party verifiers and establish procedures 
for accrediting verifiers.33 A regulated entity then contracts with an ac-
credited verifier and provides the verifier with access to all data and 
other information necessary to verify its annual emissions report.34 
Once the verification process is complete, the verifier prepares a verifi-
cation report that makes a judgment as to whether the emissions report 
is free of material misstatements and other material non-
conformities.35 Regulated entities submit the verification opinion with 
their annual emissions report to the responsible member state regula-
ry
                                                                                                                     
to  agency.36 
 California and Massachusetts also require third-party verification 
in their regulatory frameworks for greenhouse gas emissions report-
ing.37 Under California’s mandatory reporting rule, sources must con-
 
32 Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), Eur. Comm’n: Climate Action, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2010). 
33 Commission Decision 2004/156, Establishing Guidelines for the Monitoring and 
Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council, arts. 1–2, 2004 O.J. (L 59) 1, 1 (EC). The Commis-
sion adopted a revised version of these guidelines on July 18, 2007. Commission Decision 
2007/589, arts. 2–3, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 1, 3 (EC) [hereinafter Commission Decision]. 
34 See generally [U.K.] Dep’t of Energy & Climate Change, EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme: The Quick Guide for Operators on Preparing for Annual Verification 
(2008) (outlining the annual verification process for operators in the United Kingdom), 
available at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/emissions/eu_ets/euets_phase_ii/ 
monitoring/monitoring.aspx (click on “The quick guide for operators on preparing for 
annual verification” and then click “download”). 
35 Commission Decision, supra note 33, § 10.4.2(d). The materiality threshold in the 
EU ETS is two percent or five percent depending on the type of regulated entity. Id. 
§ 10.4.2(a). In other words, if the difference between the annual emissions report and the 
verifier’s findings is less than two percent, then the misstatement would not be considered 
material. Id. 
36 Id. § 10.4.2(e). 
37 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Verification, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., 
http://arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-ver/ghg-ver.htm (last updated Nov. 14, 2011) (explain-
ing that California regulations require parties to verify greenhouse gas reporting data); Over-
view of the Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA), Mass.gov, http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/ 
climate/gwsa.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (explaining that the 2009 amendments to the 
Global Warming Solutions Act require parties to verify greenhouse gas reporting data). 
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tract with an accredited verification body every year or every three years 
(depending on their sector and size) to provide a verification opinion 
after they have submitted their emissions data reports.38 Similar to the 
EU ETS, a positive verification opinion is given if the emissions data 
report is both free of material misstatements and conforms to the rule’s 
requirements.39 Verification bodies are accredited directly by the Cali-
fornia Air Resources Board (ARB), the governmental agency responsi-
ble for implementing and enforcing the rule.40 The Massachusetts re-
porting rule requires that regulated entities have their emissions 
reports verified every three years.41 Verifiers must be accredited by the 
Climate Registry and the American National Standards Institute (AN-
SI), and receive recognition from the Massachusetts Department of En-
vironmental Protection.42 
     
B. Food Safety Regulation 
 The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 employs third-party 
verification to achieve its regulatory goals for the safety of imported 
food.43 The Act requires the FDA to refuse admission of food articles 
that are not accompanied by a “certification or other assurance” that 
the food meets the applicable requirements of the Act.44 The Act also 
charges the FDA with establishing a system for recognizing accredita-
tion bodies that will accredit “third-party auditors” to conduct such cer-
tification.45 When contracted to do so by an importer, the third-party 
auditors would be responsible for performing an audit to determine 
the food’s compliance with the Act and issuing a certification to ac-
                                                                                                                 
38 Regulation for the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Cal. Code 
Regs. tit. 17, §§ 95100–95133 (2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2007/ 
ghg
). The materiality threshold under 
the 
ghg-ver/accreditation_oversight.pdf 
(exp
s. 7.71 (2009), availa-
ble a
 Ac-
cre
. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011). 
1999 & Supp. 2011). 
1)(A)(i). 
2007/frofinoal.pdf. 
39 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95131(c)(2)(B) (2010
California rule is five percent. See id. § 95102(113). 
40 Cal. Air Res. Bd., California Air Resources Board Greenhouse Gas Verifica-
tion Program: Requirements for Accreditation of Verification Bodies and Verifiers 
(2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/
laining that the ARB accredits verification bodies). 
41 Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 310 Mass. Code Reg
t http://www.mass.gov/dep/service/regulations/310cmr07.pdf. 
42 Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Information Sheet on Verification Body
ditation (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/climate/ghgvba.pdf. 
43 See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L
44 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 
45 Id. § 384d(b)(
2012] Regulation by Third-Party Verification 9 
company each food shipment imported into the United States by the 
importer.46 
 The Act states that third-party auditors can be foreign govern-
ments, agencies of a foreign government, foreign cooperatives, or any 
other third party that the FDA deems appropriate, including individu-
als.47 The law instructs the FDA to write “model accreditation stan-
dards” setting forth the rules for third-party audits and food certifica-
tions.48 The law also provides that third-party auditors must make 
records of their audits available upon request;49 that auditors must in-
form the FDA immediately if they discover conditions that could cause 
or contribute to a serious risk to public health;50 and that auditors will 
lose their accreditation if they certify a food that is linked to an out-
break of food borne illness.
omplete.54 LSPs also perform much of the remediation 
ork
                                                                                                                     
51 
C. Other Programs 
 The role of private actors in determining compliance with social 
regulation is actually older and more varied than the high-profile ex-
amples above suggest. States and localities have developed a variety of 
regulatory programs in which private inspectors do work akin to third-
party verification. For example, in Massachusetts, state law requires re-
gulated entities to hire private consultants licensed by the state to over-
see hazardous waste site remediation projects.52 The consultant, re-
ferred to as “a licensed site professional” (LSP), performs the core 
regulatory function of assessing whether completed remediation work 
conforms to the standards set forth in state regulations.53 In the proc-
ess, the LSP categorizes the cleanup site into one of several hazard tiers, 
approves the scope of work based on a site investigation, evaluates and 
selects a remedial action alternative, and ultimately certifies that the 
cleanup is c
w , problematically blurring the boundaries between regulators and 
regulated.55 
 
46 See id. § 381. 
47 Id. § 384d(a)(3). 
48 Id. § 384d(b)(2). 
49 Id. § 384d(c)(3)(B). 
50 21 U.S.C.A. § 384d(c)(4)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011). 
51 Id. § 384d(c)(6)(A)(i). 
52 Miriam Seifter, Rent-a-Regulator: Design and Innovation in Privatized Governmental Deci-
sionmaking, 33 Ecology L.Q. 1091, 1096–97 (2006). 
53 Id. at 1107. 
54 Id. at 1109–11. 
55 See id. at 1111. 
10 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1 
 Many other little-known examples of third-party verification exist 
at the state, federal, and international levels. In Massachusetts, third-
party inspectors also assess compliance with underground storage tank 
laws.56 In Rhode Island, third-party auditors inspect school lunch pro-
grams to assess conformity with governmental requirements.57 In Cali-
fornia, third parties evaluate the energy efficiency programs of regu-
lated utilities to determine whether they meet energy-saving goals.58 In 
California and other states, private smog-check stations test whether 
automobiles meet pollution emissions standards.59 In many cities, pri-
te
PA allows and encourages changes to annual re-
ort
                                                                                                                     
va  building inspectors assess whether new construction and renova-
tions meet the local building code.60 
 At the national level, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) uses a system of third-party verification to regulate fuels and ad-
ditives under the Clean Air Act.61 Fuel producers and importers con-
tract with independent certified public accountants to conduct “attest 
engagements” to verify compliance with standards for reformulated 
gasoline, sulfur content, and renewable fuel content.62 After the regu-
lated entity has submitted an annual report to the EPA, the accountant 
conducts an “audit of records” to determine whether a company’s in-
ternal records support its reported data and representations regarding 
compliance.63 The E
p s based on the results of the attest engagement, and such changes 
are often made.64 
 Practices similar to third-party verification have also been prevalent 
in the health care sector. The Department of Health and Human Ser-
 
56 Third-Party UST Inspector Frequently Asked Questions, Mass.gov, http://www.mass.gov/ 
dep/toxics/ust/tpifaq.htm#1 (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
57 School Cafeteria Inspections, State of R.I.: Dep’t of Health, http://www.health. 
state.ri.us/foodprotection/about/inspections/cafeteria/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
58 Noah Kaufman & Karen Palmer, Energy-Efficiency Program Evaluations: Opportunities for 
Learning and Inputs to Incentive Mechanisms 1 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 
RFF DP 10-16, 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/rff-dp-10-16.pdf. 
59 Smog & Emission Checks in California, DMV.org, http://www.dmv.org/ca-california/ 
smog-check.php#When_to_Smog_and_Where_to_Go (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
60 E.g., Matt Galnor, Jacksonville May Hire Private Company for Building Inspections, Jack-
sonville.com (May 4, 2010, 5:45 PM), http://m.jacksonville.com/news/metro/2010-05-
04/story/jacksonville-may-hire-private-company-building-inspections. 
61 Memorandum from Ruth Mead et al., ERG, to Suzanne Kocchi and Kong Chiu, U.S. 
EPA Headquarters, Washington D.C. 10–11 (Feb. 10, 2009) [hereinafter ERG Memo], 
available at http://www.epa.gov/climate/climatechange/emissions/archived/downloads/ 
tsd/Verification%20approaches%20memo%20(2-10-09)%20Final.pdf. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 11. 
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vices relied for many years on the nongovernmental Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations to verify that health care 
providers for Medicare complied with the government’s “conditions of 
participation” relating to health and safety.65 Notably, government has 
historically played a minimal regulatory role in health care, leaving not 
, which similarly sought to enable industrialized countries’ gov-
rnm
child abuse, and employers must determine whether prospective em-
just licensure but also the development of quality standards for hospi-
tals and other health care institutions in the hands of the industry.66 
 At the international level, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) also relies on a type of third-party verification. The 
CDM enables greenhouse gas emissions reductions projects to earn 
credits that can be sold to industrialized countries to meet their bind-
ing emissions reductions targets.67 The independent third-party audi-
tors that verify the quantity of emissions reductions in a CDM project 
are referred to as “Designated Operational Entities.”68 They are accred-
ited and overseen by the CDM Executive Board, and they may be fined 
or suspended for substandard work.69 Before the Kyoto Protocol, third-
party verification was used in some national joint implementation pro-
grams under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
e ents to invest in emissions reduction projects in developing coun-
tries.70 
 Finally, it is worth noting that governments frequently rely on oth-
er types of third parties to promote law abidance in a wide range of set-
tings. Restaurant owners must ensure the respect of no-smoking and 
underage drinking laws, social workers must report suspected cases of 
                                                                                                                      
65 Michael J. Astrue, Health Care Reform and the Constitutional Limits on Private Accredita-
tion as an Alternative to Direct Government Regulation, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 
1994, at 75, 77 (explaining that the responsible agency within the Department of Health 
and
inney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute 
for D
ns Framework Convention on 
Clim
nism able Dev. L. & Pol’y, Winter 2010, at 25, 28–29 (stating that some third-
part
 Human Services has resisted becoming a regulator itself and has been receptive to the 
use of private accrediting agencies). 
66 Freeman, supra note 19, at 610; Eleanor D. K
irect Government Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate?, 
Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1994, at 47, 50. 
67 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), United Natio
ate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_ 
mechanism/items/2718.php (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
68 The Offset Quality Initiative, Assessing Offset Quality in the Clean Development Mecha-
, Sustain
y verifiers under the CDM have been criticized for a lack of capacity and competency). 
69 See id. 
70 Gabriela Llobet, “Trust but Verify”: Verification in the Joint Implementation Regime, 31 
Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 233, 235–37(1998). 
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ployees are legally eligible to work.71 With responsibilities like these, 
private actors routinely act as “gatekeepers” to supplement governmen-
tal enforcement efforts.72 
II. Reasons to Endorse 
ance, third-party verification 
ay
t categorizing a function as public or 
riva
                                                                                                                     
A. Embracing Public-Private Governance 
 In third-party verification, private third-party verifiers essentially 
act in the place of governmental agents to conduct inspections and 
make regulatory compliance determinations. Governmental agencies, 
in turn, take on new roles in coordinating and overseeing these private 
actors. As a form of public-private govern
m  further the goals of social regulation. 
 The term “public-private partnership” has been used to describe 
the wide array of arrangements through which public and private ac-
tors together do the work of governing society. As explained by one 
scholar, “many public services and functions are produced by a highly 
interdependent network of public-private partnerships woven together 
by history, practice, and mission, and constrained by direct regulation, 
contract, and informal agreement.”73 Indeed, the public and private 
may become so intertwined tha
p te may cease to be useful.74 
 The study of public-private partnerships forms part of the body of 
scholarship known as “new governance.”75 In coining the term “new 
governance,” one scholar chose “governance” rather than “govern-
ment” to emphasize that addressing public problems relies on the col-
laboration of “a wide array of third parties in addition to government.”76 
The word “new” refers not to the novelty of collaborative approaches, 
which are actually quite old, but to the idea that these approaches re-
quire a new degree of attention to understand the challenges and op-
 
71 Janet A. Gilboy, Compelled Third-Party Participation in the Regulatory Process: Legal Du-
ties,
eepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 
J.L.
 16, at 1236 (using the 
term ibe this phenomenon). 
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 
342
mon, supra note 75, at 8. 
 Culture, and Noncompliance, 20 L. & Pol’y 135, 137–39 (1998). 
72 Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatek
 Econ. & Org. 53, 53 (1986). 
73 Freeman, supra note 16, at 1288; see also Minow, supra note
 “public-private partnerships” to descr
74 Freeman, supra note 19, at 550–51. 
75 See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduc-
tion, in The Tools of Government, supra note 10, at 1, 2; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The 
Fall of Regulation and 
, 343–44 (2004). 
76 Sala
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portunities they present.77 New governance is contrasted with “old gov-
ernance,” in which regulation is more centralized and government acts 
 a 
-private relationships are often 
rm
 are relied on by the 
ve
                                                                                                                     
in top-down, coercive fashion.78 
 Another scholar has also used the term “third-party government” 
to capture the extent to which a wide variety of third parties in partner-
ship with the government carry out government programs and deliver 
publicly funded services.79 Private banks issue loans backed by the gov-
ernment.80 Government pays for health care provided by private hospi-
tals accredited by private accreditation boards.81 Private companies re-
ceive public funds to run schools, prisons, and other social service 
programs.82 The U.S. military increasingly relies on private companies 
to run training camps, provide security services, and even conduct in-
telligence operations.83 These public
fo alized in government contracts.84 
 The varied roles of private actors in regulation have been a focus 
of the new governance literature.85 Although governmental regulation 
may be caricatured as being imposed from the top down by regulators 
onto regulated entities, both regulatory standard-setting and enforce-
ment processes are infused with public-private partnerships.86 A num-
ber of private organizations have long been involved in establishing 
standards related to the safety of commercial products and services.87 
Not uncommonly, these privately set standards
go rnment and incorporated into public law.88 
 
77 Id. 
78 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance, 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 501, 520–21 (2009). 
79 Salamon, supra note 75, at 2. 
80 See id. 
81 Kinney, supra note 66, at 47. 
82 Minow, supra note 16, at 1229. 
83 Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving Public Values 
in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs 3–4 (2010); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: 
Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in 
Government by Contract, supra note 17, at 110, 110–114. 
84 Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in Government 
by Contract, supra note 17, at 1, 1. 
85 Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 18, at 2037 (stating that the two areas of focus 
in private governance scholarship are (1) privatization of public services and (2) privatiza-
tion of regulatory activity). 
86 See id. at 2037–38. 
87 Ross E. Cheit, Setting Safety Standards: Regulation in the Public and Pri-
vate Sectors 5–6, 12, 21–28 (1990). 
88 Id. at 31; Freeman, supra note 19, at 639–40. 
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 Environmental law provides important examples of private in-
volvement in enforcement. Private environmental groups may supple-
ment governmental enforcement by monitoring regulated entities and 
filing “private attorney general” actions to impose legal penalties in 
se
e state 
ow
ernmental regulator, third-party verifiers are likely to approach the regu-
lated entity in a cooperative, peer-to-peer manner that may induce 
gre
ca s of noncompliance.89 Also, private companies perform a regula-
tory role when they police the environmental and labor law compliance 
of firms with whom they do business.90 
 Although concerns abound about the privatization of public func-
tions, Freeman usefully observes that public-private partnerships may 
also lead to the “publicization” of relevant private activity.91 In other 
words, private actors can be induced to commit themselves to tradi-
tionally public goals and behave according to traditional norms of pub-
lic action such as accountability, due process, and rationality.92 Freeman 
argues that an enhanced private role in governance need not imply a 
weak state. Rather, “public/private engagement may enhanc
p er while simultaneously augmenting private power.”93 Whether pri-
vatization leads to publicization and the continued strength of the state 
depends on how the public-private partnerships are structured. 
 Third-party verification can easily be viewed as one of the many 
ways in which public and private entities can work together to achieve 
public goals. Notably, in the regulatory role of monitoring to detect 
noncompliance, third-party verifiers may have an advantage over agency 
inspectors. As private parties that lack the sanctioning power of a gov-
ater information sharing.94 This may be particularly appropriate in 
                                                                                                                      
89 See Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen 
Par . L. Rev. 269, 283–84 (2005); Bar-
ton novation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
185
ing text. 
ll, The Role of Deterrence-
 
ticipation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 Geo. Wash
 H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing In
, 192–93. 
90 See infra notes 101–109 and accompany
91 Freeman, supra note 16, at 1285. 
92 See id. 
93 Freeman, supra note 19, at 671. 
94 A long-running debate in the regulatory enforcement literature has been whether a 
coercive, deterrence-based approach or a cooperative, persuasive approach is more effective. 
See generally Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (1992) (advocating the use of both approaches together); Eugene 
Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unrea-
sonableness, at ix–x (1982); Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, Depiction of the 
Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship in the Chemical Industry: Deterrence-Based vs. Cooperative 
Enforcement, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 603 (2007) (arguing that the relation-
ship between regulator and regulated entity is multidimensional and the ideal types of puni-
tive and cooperative do not capture this complexity); David L. Marke
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the enforcement of new types of regulation such as greenhouse gas re-
porting requirements.95 Moreover, the process of third-party verification 
is generally structured to promote communication and correction when 
instances of noncompliance are found.96 In contrast to a traditional in-
spection by an agency official, the interaction with third-party verifiers 
may be perceived by regulated entities less as a judgment day and more 
as an opportunity to learn and improve.97 
B. Harnessing Auditing Industry Expertise 
 Another advantage of third-party verification is that a great deal of 
expertise to inspect and make compliance determinations exists in the 
private sector. A large private inspection industry has developed 
through voluntary auditing practices as well as voluntary certification 
schemes.98 In these initiatives, private entities are often hired to monitor 
and assess compliance with a wide array of standards set by either the 
government or private organizations.99 This large and growing corps of 
private inspectors has been aptly termed the “third-party assurance in-
dustry.”100 
 Many companies voluntarily commission third parties to conduct 
audits for internal operational purposes.101 For example, in the envi-
ronmental arena, companies may seek a general compliance audit102 to 
                                                                                                                      
Base
rcement, states tend to endorse cooperative approaches). 
porting the proposition that much 
non
haffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Envi-
ronm rcement, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1181, 1250–51 (1998). 
 
d Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Real-
ity, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (arguing that although the EPA endorses deterrence-
based enfo
95 See Salzman et al., supra note 6, at 261, 281 (sup
compliance is involuntary, due to factors such as the complexity and ambiguity of reg-
ulations). 
96 See infra notes 373–375 and accompanying text. 
97 See Clifford Rechtsc
ental Enfo
98 See Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. 
Corp. L. 325, 329 (2008). 
99 See id. 
100 See id. at 329–30 (tracing the origins of the third-party assurance industry and many 
of its most important firms back to the 1800s when marine insurance companies hired 
private inspectors to make sure that ships carrying insured goods were seaworthy). 
101 See Neil Gunningham & James Prest, Environmental Audit as a Regulatory Strategy: Pros-
pects and Reform, 15 Sydney L. Rev. 492, 495 (1993) (distinguishing between operational 
audits, which include compliance and management audits, and transactional audits). 
102 An “‘[e]nvironmental Audit’ is a systematic, documented, periodic and objective 
review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting envi-
ronmental requirements.” Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction 
and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000). The term “envi-
ronmental audit” emerged in the 1980s with reference to the financial audit. Christine 
Parker, Regulator-Required Corporate Compliance Program Audits, 25 Law & Pol’y 221, 223 
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determine their overall compliance status with environmental laws, or a 
narrower compliance audit regarding a specific aspect of their opera-
tions such as land contamination, equipment performance, or moni-
toring system design.103 Companies are motivated to conduct voluntary 
compliance audits to reduce their risk of enforcement liability.104 Com-
panies may also commission a “management audit” to assess an envi-
ronmental management system.105 
 Third-party audits are also commissioned in the course of many 
legal transactions. Companies purchasing other companies may employ 
third-parties to assess their regulatory compliance.106 Lending institu-
tions and insurance agencies may similarly use independent auditors to 
evaluate a potential client.107 In addition, governmental agencies have 
sometimes required that regulated entities contract with a third party to 
conduct compliance or management audits as part of enforcement ac-
                                                                                                                      
(2003) (stating that the term “audit” is designed to import the features of a financial au-
ty: Rituals of Verification (1997); Michael Power, Expertise and the Con-
stru it, 22 Acct., Orgs. & Soc’y, 123, 
126
would grant regu-
lato
EPA defined 
and
 
Private Life, supra note 18, at 2045–50 (explaining that private envi-
ronmental assessment is common in corporate acquisition agreements). 
107 See id. at 2045. 
dit). For a theorization of the phenomenon of audit, see generally Michael Power, The 
Audit Socie
ction of Relevance: Accountants and Environmental Aud
 (1997). 
103 See Gunningham & Prest, supra note 101, at 495. 
104 See id. at 507; cf. Nancy Kubasek et al., Mandatory Environmental Auditing: A Better 
Way to Secure Environmental Protection in the United States and Canada, 18 J. Land Resources 
& Envtl. L. 261, 264 (1998). On the question of whether the law should encourage envi-
ronmental audits by protecting audit reports from disclosure in legal proceedings and 
immunizing violations that were discovered and disclosed from legal penalty, see David A. 
Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 969 (1996) 
(discussing why environmental audit immunity might be “environmentally harmful”); Jay 
P. Kesan, Encouraging Firms to Police Themselves: Strategic Prescriptions to Promote Corporate Self-
Auditing, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 155 (arguing for a balanced approach that 
rs access to audit information, limit third-party access to such information, and “pro-
vide mitigated penalties for firms engaging in good-faith self-policing”). 
105 An environmental management system (EMS) consists of a set of policies and pro-
grams that are established within a company to manage environmentally relevant aspects 
of the company’s operations. See Magali A. Delmas, Barriers and Incentives to the Adoption of 
ISO 14001 by Firms in the United States, 11 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 1, 3–4 (2000); Stepan 
Wood, Environmental Management Systems and Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking Environ-
mental Governance, 10 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 129, 134–35 (2003) (explaining an EMS as consist-
ing of planning, implementing, checking, corrective action, and review); see also George 
Van Cleve, The Changing Intersection of Environmental Auditing, Environmental Law and En-
forcement Policy, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1215, 1229 (1991) (explaining that the 
 distinguished compliance audits and management audits in its 1986 Policy on the 
Inclusion of Environmental Auditing Provisions in Enforcement Provisions).
106 Vandenbergh, 
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tions.108 Although in this case the audit is mandatory rather than vol-
untary, the audit process is similar.109 
                                                                                                                     
 Companies that buy goods from other companies may impose cer-
tain social or environmental requirements on suppliers, and require the 
suppliers to contract third-party social audits to ensure conformity with 
those requirements.110 This is particularly prevalent when companies in 
developed countries source products from companies in developing 
countries. One scholar documents the presence of a “vast network of 
private agreements that impose environmental and other standards, 
whether collectively or unilaterally adopted.”111 By his analysis, private 
environmental contracting is widespread in major sectors such as the 
discount and variety retail, home improvement retail, automobile man-
ufacturing, and lumber and wood production sectors.112 Similarly, in the 
garment and sportswear industries, many buyers impose conditions on 
suppliers relating to child labor and other factory practices.113 Each 
year, tens of thousands of social audits are commissioned by hundreds of 
brand-name companies and retailers in these sectors.114 
 Voluntary certification schemes have also contributed to the de-
velopment of the third-party assurance industry.115 Certification 
schemes, in which a label or recognition is awarded if certain standards 
are met, are varied. They have developed for products such as organic 
food, facilities or operations such as sustainable forest operations, and 
 
108 Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 
16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 365, 394 (1992); Van Cleve, supra note 105, at 1229–31. 
109 See David L. Markell, States as Innovators, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 347, 406–08 (1994) (de-
scribing how the state of New York required egregious violators to hire agency-approved 
auditing firms to conduct comprehensive environmental audits of the violator’s operations 
on an ongoing basis). 
110 These requirements often grow out of voluntary corporate codes established by re-
tailers. See, e.g., Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability, in Environ-
mental Law for Sustainability 229, 230 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 
2006) (defining voluntary environmental codes as “commitments undertaken by one or 
more polluters or resource users, in the absence of an express legal requirement to do so, 
prescribing norms to regulate their behaviour in relation to their interaction with the en-
vironment”). 
111 Vandenbergh, New Wal-Mart, supra note 18, at 916. 
112 See id. at 926–27. 
113 See Clean Clothes Campaign, Looking for a Quick Fix: How Weak Social Au-
diting Is Keeping Workers in Sweatshops 56, 69, 79–80 (2005), available at http://www. 
cleanclothes.org/resources/national-ccc/1166-looking-for-a-quick-fix. 
114 Id. at 12, 58–59 (presenting additional information about the numbers of audits 
conducted by particular companies). 
115 Wood, supra note 110, at 261 (identifying a trend toward third-party verification, 
and stating that “[a] huge industry of auditors, certifiers and accreditation bodies has 
emerged to serve these expanding certification needs”). 
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organizations such as environmental management systems.116 Certifica-
tion schemes may be established by industry, public interest organiza-
tions, or the government. Although such schemes are increasingly pre-
valent, they tend to suffer from credibility problems as consumers and 
others doubt that certified products and facilities truly meet the 
scheme’s standards.117 Many schemes were initially weak in the area of 
monitoring and enforcement.118 Third-party certification emerged as a 
way of giving credibility to certification programs and is considered a 
“best practice” used in the most rigorous programs.119 
 The forest products label from the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC), for example, uses third-party verification extensively.120 To be 
certified, a forest products company must contract with an accredited 
third-party certification body to assess its conformity with FSC’s princi-
ples, criteria, and standards.121 The FSC contracts with a private com-
pany, Accreditation Services International (ASI), to serve as the pro-
gram’s accreditation body.122 ASI audits certification bodies to assess 
their performance and determine whether their status as a certification 
body will be maintained.123 The Marine Stewardship Council, created 
in 1997 to provide certification to sustainable fisheries, uses a similar 
system of third-party certification.124 
 The Energy Star Program, established by the EPA in 1992 to pro-
vide a labeling system for products that meet certain voluntary energy 
efficiency standards, recently adopted a third-party certification sys-
                                                                                                                      
116 See id. (distinguishing certification for products from certification for organiza-
tions). 
117 See Clean Clothes Campaign, supra note 113, at 12 (noting that labor rights activ-
ists initially questioned the motives and effectiveness of social audits); Gunningham & 
Prest, supra note 101, at 512 (stating that companies face the danger that audits “will de-
generate into public relations exercises for industry”). 
118 See Wood, supra note 110, at 260 (stating that “[u]ntil recently many, and perhaps 
most voluntary environmental codes made no provision for monitoring or reporting of 
performance”). 
119 Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, The Voluntary Environmentalists: Green 
Clubs, ISO 14001, and Voluntary Regulations 59 & n.26 (2006); see also Wood, supra note 
110, at 261 (stating that “[t]he ultimate form of external verification of code implementation 
is third-party certification”). 
120 See Meidinger, supra note 15, at 70–73. 
121 What Is Certification?, Forest Stewardship Council U.S., http://www.fscus.org/ 
faqs/what_is_certification.php (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
122 See FSC Accreditation Program, Forest Stewardship Council, http://www.fsc.org/ 
accreditation.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
123 See id. 
124 Third Party Certification, Marine Stewardship Council, http://www.msc.org/ 
about-us/standards/third-party-certification (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
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tem.125 As of 2011, Energy Star requires that products carrying the label 
be certified by third parties.126 Previously, manufacturers self-declared to 
the EPA that their products met the Energy Star requirements.127 With 
the new third-party certification requirement, product testing must be 
conducted in an accredited laboratory and the results must be certified 
and submitted to the EPA by an accredited certification body.128 Labora-
tories and certification bodies may be accredited either directly by the 
EPA or by an EPA-recognized accreditation body.129 The EPA’s Water 
Sense program, which provides a label for high-performing, water-
efficient products, similarly requires third-party verification.130 
  In the arena of climate change regulation, the Climate Registry is 
a voluntary nonprofit collaboration founded in 2007 by North Ameri-
can states, provinces and territories.131 It sets standards to calculate, 
verify, and publicly report greenhouse gas emissions in a single regis-
                                                                                                                      
125 See History of Energy Star, Energy Star, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c= 
about.ab_history (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) (describing the history of the Energy Star 
program, and noting that labeled products include major appliances, office equipment, 
lighting, and home electronics). 
126 Third-Party Verification Required for Energy Star Products, Consulting-Specifying Engi-
neer (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.csemag.com/search/search-single-display/third-party-
verification-required-for-energy-star-products/0314063836.html. 
127 See id. 
128 See Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Certification Bodies for the EnergyStar Program 2, 
Energy Star, http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads/mou/Conditions_and_ 
Criteria_for_Recognition_of_Certification_Bodies.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) (stating 
that the certification body must agree in writing to “[c]onfirm that all data in the test re-
port originated from an EPA-recognized laboratory with an appropriate scope of accredita-
tion” and “[r]eport to EPA certified products and at a minimum the key data elements 
enumerated in the applicable EnergyStar product specification(s)”); id. at 4 (stating that 
the certification body must agree in writing to ensure that “[v]erification testing [is] per-
formed at an EPA-recognized, third-party laboratory”); see also Conditions and Criteria for Rec-
ognition of Laboratories for the EnergyStar Program 1–2, Energy Star, http://www.energystar. 
gov/ia/partners/downloads/mou/Criteria_Laboratories.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) 
(establishing requirements for accredited laboratories). 
129 See Accreditation Body Resources, Energy Star, http://www.energystar.gov/index. 
cfm?c=third_party_certification.tpc_accred_bodies (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) (noting 
that EPA-recognized accreditation bodies “provide accreditation for laboratories and certi-
fication bodies”). By May 2011, the EPA had recognized about twenty-five accreditation 
bodies around the world. See EPA-Recognized Accreditation Bodies, Energy Star, http://www. 
energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=partners.epa_recognized_accreditation_bodies (last visited Dec. 
27, 2011). 
130 U.S. EPA, Product Certification System 1 (2011), available at http://www.epa. 
gov/watersense/docs/cert_system_508.pdf; WaterSense Product Certification, U.S. EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/watersense/partners/certification.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
131 See About, The Climate Registry, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/ (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2011); Board of Directors, The Climate Registry, http://www.theclimate 
registry.org/about/board-of-directors/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
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try.132 Companies and organizations that report their annual emissions 
and have them verified by an accredited third party earn the right to 
use the “Climate Registered” logo.133 ANSI accredits third-party verifi-
ers in the United States, and similar national standards organizations 
accredit certifiers in Canada and Mexico.134 ANSI receives and reviews 
the application, conducts site visits to the applicant’s facility to collect 
further information, and makes the accreditation decision.135 ANSI 
also conducts surveillance of accredited verifiers to check continued 
conformity with accreditation requirements.136 The Climate Registry 
maintains an oversight panel to monitor ANSI’s accreditation proc-
ess.137 
C. Moving Toward Full Compliance 
 Third-party verification is a type of “gatekeeper” strategy that 
serves as an alternative to traditional monitoring and enforcement 
strategies. By providing for the compliance status of all regulated enti-
ties to be verified, it offers a pathway toward full compliance. Also, in 
the process, it provides more complete information about the regula-
tory performance of regulated entities. Full compliance—and com-
plete compliance data—is critical to the success of some forms of regu-
lation and socially desirable in many others. 
 Traditional regulatory enforcement is based primarily on deter-
rence theory, which posits that a regulated entity will comply with the 
law when the expected cost of noncompliance exceeds the benefit 
gained by the violation.138 The cost of noncompliance may be incurred 
in the form of civil or criminal sanctions, as well as in other ways such as 
damage to reputation and legal costs.139 For the regulated entity, the 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Mission, The Climate Registry, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/ 
mission/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
133 Membership Options, The Climate Registry, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/ 
how-to-join/membership-options/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
134 ERG Memo, supra note 61, at A-1. 
135 Id. at A-2. 
136 Id. 
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138 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 97, at 1186–87; see also Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement 
at the EPA: High Stakes and Hard Choices 101–06 (1995) (contending that the EPA’s 
enforcement programs are deterrent in nature). 
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(2003). 
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relevant measure of cost is “expected cost,” which implies a discounting 
to reflect the fact that the probability of detection is less than one.140 
 When sanctions are not sufficiently severe or when there is a low 
probability of detection, deterrence is weakened.141 These problems 
have indeed plagued regulatory enforcement. Governmental agencies 
charged with implementing social regulation tend to lack the resources 
to conduct sufficiently frequent inspections and collect reliable com-
pliance data. Regulatory inspections are often sporadic, perhaps occur-
ring only every few years. For example, the FDA inspects on average 
only twenty-four percent of regulated facilities each year.142 A 2007 re-
port by the EPA Office of the Inspector General found that the EPA 
“did not have current and complete data on either the regulated enti-
ties or changes in their compliance status.”143 While industry is often 
required to self-monitor and report to the government on a regular 
basis, this data is of questionable quality.144 
 In many regulatory programs, states have the primary responsibil-
ity for enforcement and are overburdened.145 States reportedly conduct 
about ninety percent of all environmental regulatory inspections and 
file eighty to ninety percent of environmental enforcement actions.146 
Yet the resources for regulatory inspections at the state level have not 
grown at the same rate as the number of regulated facilities.147 In the 
area of Clean Water Act enforcement, for example, the number of re-
gulated facilities doubled over a recent ten-year period in which state 
enforcement budgets remained essentially flat.148 Additional pressures 
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142 Elena Fagotto, Governing a Global Food Supply: How the 2010 FDA Food Safety Moderni-
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143 U.S. EPA Office of Inspector Gen., Evaluation Report No. 2007-P-00027, 
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146 Markell, supra note 94, at 32. 
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Expand Transparency 3 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/pub- 
lications/civil/programs/cwa/actionplan-implpriorities.pdf (stating that the universe of 
point sources has grown from roughly 100,000 to over a million). 
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on state budgetary resources make this trend likely to continue or wor-
sen.149 
 Moreover, deterrence may be ineffective because the assumptions 
of deterrence theory fail. Deterrence theory assumes that regulated 
entities voluntarily choose whether to comply or not based on a ra-
tional, profit-maximizing calculus of costs and benefits.150 But regula-
tions are complex and sometimes difficult to interpret.151 Regulated 
entities may unintentionally fail to comply because they do not under-
stand what the law requires.152 A cooperative theory of enforcement 
offers an alternative predicated on the idea that regulated companies 
are not just rational profit maximizers but also moral actors that are 
usually committed to complying with the law.153 A cooperative ap-
proach to enforcement emphasizes education and persuasion rather 
than punitive sanctions.154 
 Third-party verification is a gatekeeper strategy that builds on the 
insights of the cooperative theory of enforcement and offers an alter-
native to deterrence-based enforcement. As defined by one scholar, ga-
tekeepers are “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by 
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers.”155 Reliance on gate-
keepers is a useful strategy when deterrence is ineffective or impracti-
cable.156 Accountants and lawyers, for example, are “natural gatekeep-
ers for fraudulent securities transactions that require audits or legal 
opinions in order to close.”157 As with third-party verification in the 
regulatory context, these third parties may prevent misconduct by 
withholding their approval.158 
 Importantly, the mere knowledge that a third party will inspect 
their activities can change the behavior of regulated firms. When man-
agers expect outside observers, they tend to change how they perform 
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their jobs and how they relate to other managers in ways that favor ad-
herence.159 As such, the performance of an individual or group im-
proves when it is singled out for observation and study by an out-
sider.160 Also in the third-party verification process, there are 
opportunities for third-party verifiers to educate and persuade the 
regulated entity to comply. 
                                                                                                                     
 In addition to promoting greater compliance among regulated 
entities, third-party verification could furnish more and better data 
about compliance and regulatory performance. Verification of regula-
tory compliance would occur at predetermined, regular intervals, cre-
ating more complete and reliable compliance information. Like cur-
rent governmental enforcement, third-party verification would often 
rely on the self-monitoring data produced by the regulated entity. But 
now, this data would be independently verified to detect inconsistencies 
and ensure completeness. Third parties would provide systematic and 
objective reviews of whether legal requirements are being met.161 
 In these ways, a well-designed third-party verification system can be 
expected to result in both greater compliance and better compliance 
data. With better data about compliance, regulatory agencies would 
have more information to determine what types of regulation are effec-
tive and how to spend their regulatory resources.162 If the information 
is released to external stakeholders, such as consumers and investors, in 
a manner that enables them to distinguish between good and bad per-
formers, then these stakeholders may also be able to reward and punish 
firms through their marketplace decisions.163 Reliable data would also 
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(1998) (stating that audits could provide “systematic, documented, periodic, and objective 
reviews of whether OHS requirements are being met and whether systems are being ad-
hered to”); Paul R. Kleindorfer, Market-Based Environmental Audits and Environmental Risks: 
Implementing ISO 14000, 22 Geneva Papers on Risk & Ins. 194, 203 (1997) (“[The] use of 
third parties, together with an informed public, has the potential to increase the efficiency 
and service quality of monitoring and inspection services as compared to the more bu-
reaucratic procedures within the government.”). 
162 Cf. Flatt & Collins, supra note 11, at 55 (“Those charged with drafting and enforc-
ing our environmental laws have had to work with little or no information about whether 
or not these programs are actually working properly.”). 
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allow the public to independently analyze how well regulatory pro-
grams are working.164 
D. Meeting the Needs of New Regulation 
 As regulation increasingly targets new types of activities and uses 
market-based approaches, regulatory data needs are growing in com-
plexity and magnitude. The regulation of imported products, for exam-
ple, reaches activities that are transnational in scope.165 Toys, clothes, 
food, drugs, and other products that may cause harm are now produced 
in a global economy, and their regulation requires information about 
how products were made and handled in other countries. Yet govern-
mental inspectors in the traditional model of social regulation are un-
likely to have either the resources or the authority to collect such infor-
mation. 
 Greater data needs are also associated with the use of market-based 
regulatory instruments. One of the reasons that technology-based stan-
dards were often employed in the early years of environmental law is 
that they were relatively easily enforced.166 Compliance could generally 
be verified by ascertaining the installation and functionality of a pollu-
tion control technology and by conducting a spot check to show that 
the applicable performance standard was met. Records that verified 
periodic sampling and technology maintenance could provide further 
confirmation of compliance. 
 Modern regulatory ambitions, however, have moved past technol-
ogy-based standards and towards market-based regulation. Market-
based regulation seeks to change behavior through market-based sig-
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nals rather than prescriptive directives.167 Examples of market-based 
environmental regulation include economic instruments, such as emis-
sions trading systems and pollution taxes, as well as information regula-
tion, such as corporate environmental reporting requirements.168 
 Enforcement of an emissions trading system requires a complete 
accounting of pollution emissions, something that companies have 
rarely been required to produce.169 For the regulatory agency to de-
termine whether a regulated facility is in compliance at the end of a 
reporting period, it must be able to ascertain that the facility has 
enough allowances to cover all the pollution emitted during the report-
ing period.170 In the absence of accurate monitoring data, the integrity 
of the allowance market—and the regulatory program as a whole—will 
be compromised.171 The fair assessment of an emissions tax also de-
pends on a complete and accurate count of emissions. 
 Information regulation may also be hobbled or derailed by unreli-
able data. Information regulation requires regulatory entities to dis-
close information on environmental performance to workers, consum-
ers, shareholders, or the public in general.172 Disclosure empowers 
these external actors to exert pressure for improved performance 
through the market and other social channels.173 
 An oft-discussed example of information regulation in U.S. law is 
the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, created by the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right to Know Act.174 The TRI re-
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quires that large polluters annually report the total amount of specified 
toxic chemicals transferred off-site or released into the air, water, or 
land.175 Regulated entities estimate these amounts, which are not gen-
erally subject to verification.176 Although it is often hailed as an effec-
tive program, the TRI has been limited by the unreliability of its data.177 
Facilities have in many cases reported declines in their toxic releases, 
but the reasons have been unclear. In some cases, reported declines 
might be due to changes in how facilities estimate their emissions, rules 
for which are not clearly established.178 In other cases, facilities may be 
substituting toxic chemicals that are not required to be reported for 
toxic chemicals that are.179 A 2004 study by environmental organiza-
tions suggested that toxic releases were underreported by about fifteen 
percent and that the releases of some toxins may be as much as five 
times higher than reported.180 
E. Shifting the Costs of Enforcement 
 Third-party verification shifts some of the costs of regulating onto 
the regulated entities. It thus holds promise in conserving scarce regu-
latory resources.181 Presently, the status quo of regulatory enforcement 
is that the government funds the agencies that inspect and sanction the 
regulated community.182 With a third-party verification system, the di-
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rect costs of inspection and compliance assessment would instead be 
borne by the regulated companies. Regulated companies would thus be 
made to internalize part of the cost of regulatory enforcement.183 
 In traditional social regulation, regulatory agencies often try to 
shift the costs of regulation through regulatory fees.184 Agencies im-
pose fees on regulated entities to help defray the agency’s regulation-
related expenses and otherwise serve regulatory purposes.185 Most 
commonly, regulated entities are required to pay permit or license fees 
that are designed to cover the costs of implementing and enforcing a 
permitting scheme.186 
                                                                                                                     
 Although such fees are commonly assessed by federal and state 
agencies, they often do not cover the full costs that the agency incurs to 
monitor and enforce regulations.187 Regulated entities and policymak-
ers may resist the imposition of such fees and contest their amount.188 
Moreover, political and administrative factors may prevent fees from 
being updated to adequately support regulatory activity.189 For these 
reasons, the shifting of the regulatory costs presently occurs in a spo-
radic and unsystematic way. Third-party verification would be a more 
reliable and consistent way to shift the regulatory costs associated with 
inspection and compliance determination. 
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 Of course, oversight of a third-party verification system still requires 
governmental resources. Third-party verification, however, enables regu-
latory agencies to focus their attention on a relatively small number of 
accredited verifiers rather than the large universe of regulated enti-
ties.190 Regulators may establish rules regarding how accreditation and 
verification should be conducted and then direct enforcement re-
sources towards ensuring compliance with these rules.191 
III. Reasons for Concern 
A. Privatizing a Core Governmental Function 
 Although regulation is replete with public-private partnerships, 
assessing legal compliance with governmental standards is arguably a 
core governmental function that should not be privatized. Of the two 
primary policy-related functions that regulatory agencies perform— 
setting standards and enforcing them—privatization is less prevalent 
and arguably less appropriate in the latter.192 Private entities have long 
been involved in setting standards, particularly for goods and services 
sold in the marketplace. In his 1990 study, one scholar found that pri-
vate standard-setting organizations had produced tens of thousands of 
private standards, of which only several thousand were likely to have 
significant public-interest implications.193 The private role in public 
standard-setting is also extensive and is especially visible in public adop-
tion of private standards and negotiated rulemaking.194 Congress and 
administrative agencies have often delegated standard-setting responsi-
bilities to private organizations and then adopted these standards for 
regulatory programs.195 
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 With respect to making compliance determinations and enforcing 
public standards, the private role has been more limited. Of course, the 
regulated entities themselves are important actors in this area. Under 
many regulatory laws, they are obligated to conduct certain monitor-
ing, recordkeeping, and reporting activities, and the information gen-
erated through these activities is critical to the enforcement process. 
Also, regulated entities regularly communicate and negotiate with 
agencies regarding possible instances of noncompliance.196 There 
comes a point in the enforcement process, however, when the agency is 
called upon to decide whether an entity is in compliance, and this deci-
sion is the agency’s responsibility. 
 Scholars have identified ways in which enforcement may be out-
sourced, but their practical application has been limited. One is that an 
agency can hire private actors to conduct enforcement.197 Government 
routinely contracts with private entities to provide government services, 
such as trash collection, prison operation, and schooling.198 Yet in-
stances of contracting private entities for enforcement services remain 
rare.199 Another private role in enforcement that is often highlighted is 
that of the “private attorney general.”200 Here, however, a governmen-
tal entity—the court—rather than the private party makes the compli-
ance determination.201 Moreover, the law often precludes private at-
torney general actions where the government has already enforced or 
is in the process of enforcing the law against the defendant.202 In this 
way, the regulatory agency has the opportunity to maintain control over 
the enforcement of its regulations. 
                                                                                                                     
 There may be good reasons that government delegation of the 
compliance-determination function is less common than delegation of 
the standard-setting function. Enforcing rules and standards is arguably 
“fundamentally public” or “inherently governmental.”203 Determining 
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whether a regulated entity is in compliance involves the exercise of a 
great deal of discretion. Compliance is often a “fluid, negotiable mat-
ter” rather than an “objectively-defined unproblematic state.”204 While 
some regulatory requirements may involve bright-line rules where non-
compliance can be easily determined, many standards are more subjec-
tive and require substantial interpretation to apply. Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has held that an agency’s decision not to pursue an 
enforcement action is presumptively unreviewable.205 As argued by one 
scholar, activities that are highly discretionary should either be kept 
within public agencies or accompanied by rigorous publicization.206 
 Moreover, the public process of regulatory compliance assessment 
as it is traditionally practiced has symbolic importance. The image of 
the governmental inspector who shows up to look for regulatory viola-
tions is powerful. Like criminal investigation and prosecution, it sends 
the message that the government “stands in for the community and 
private victims.”207 In addition, negative compliance determinations 
result in punitive sanctions that communicate the importance and 
meaning of law. Scholars of regulatory enforcement have recognized 
the importance of both specific and general deterrence.208 Specific de-
terrence refers to how a sanction prevents future noncompliance by the 
entity sanctioned. General deterrence describes how a punitive sanc-
tion against one actor can deter noncompliant behavior by many other 
actors. With third-party verification, it seems likely that there would be 
fewer violations prosecuted, potentially undermining the “expressive 
function” of deterrence-based enforcement.209 
 Aside from the argument that enforcement is fundamentally pub-
lic, one may be concerned about delegating enforcement to private 
                                                                                                                      
Government by Contract, supra note 17, at 192, 220 (describing a 1992 policy letter 
issued by the Office of Management and Budget that attempted to delineate inherently 
governmental functions). 
204 See Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the So-
cial Definition of Pollution 126 (1984). 
205 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985); see also Bryan Clark & Amanda C. 
Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can and Can’t Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 
B.C. L. Rev. 1687, 1688–90 (2011) (dicussing how agencies shield decisions from judicial 
review). 
206 Freeman, supra note 16, at 1343. 
207 Minow, supra note 16, at 1234. 
208 E.g. Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 94, at 615 n.50; David Markell, “Slack” in the 
Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 Or. L. 
Rev. 1, 22 (2005). 
209 See Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 94, at 622–23 (citing Clifford Rechtschaffen 
& David L. Markell, Reinventing Environmental Enforcement and the State/Fed- 
eral Relationship 235–37 (2003)); see also Mintz, supra note 138, at 9–10. 
2012] Regulation by Third-Party Verification 31 
parties because agencies learn from assessing compliance. The agency 
gains and maintains expertise about how its regulations are received by 
the regulated community and how they are functioning in practice. 
This knowledge in turn can be fed back into the regulatory and legisla-
tive process. By this argument, third-party verification threatens a loss 
of public capacity and expertise. Some scholars raise the possibility that 
pervasive contracting out of governmental functions could even un-
dermine the oversight capacity of government.210 As government does 
less of the work of governing, expertise could move to the private sec-
tor to the extent that agencies would be unequipped to meaningfully 
oversee their contractors. 
B. Accountability 
 A key problem in public-private partnerships is accountability.211 
Accountability is usefully defined as the extent to which actors are “an-
swerable” and “sanctionable.”212 Being answerable means having to re-
spond with information and explanation to potentially difficult and 
uncomfortable questions.213 Being sanctionable means that punish-
ment can be imposed for improper actions or inadequate responses.214 
 In traditional social regulation, regulatory agency officials are an-
swerable and sanctionable in a variety of ways. They are legally account-
able through suit in the judiciary, and politically accountable through 
the election of the executive.215 In addition, administrative law has in-
corporated a host of less formal mechanisms to make public officials 
more accountable, such as public hearings, notice-and-comment rule-
making, and administrative appeal procedures. 
 Many of these well-established routes to accountability are less 
functional when applied to public-private partnerships. Although pub-
lic actors remain accountable in the same ways, private actors are not 
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equally bound or constrained.216 The multiple nodes of authority cre-
ated in a public-private partnership may make it difficult to discern 
which actor was responsible for a particular decision or action. 
 Indeed, some interested parties might favor public-private partner-
ships precisely because they limit accountability.217 Third-party verifica-
tion places additional actors between regulated entities and the public 
in ways that may allow polluters more opportunities to withhold infor-
mation about their activities and evade responsibility. Most obviously, 
companies would not need to routinely open their doors and their 
books to the government. Private verifiers would take the place of gov-
ernmental inspectors. Moreover, if the verifier is merely required to 
provide the government with a yes-or-no report of conformity with the 
law, the amount of information available to the government and ulti-
mately to the public would be greatly reduced. The chain of account-
ability would be longer, with the concerns of the public becoming more 
distant from the potentially harmful activity.218 
 In thinking about how to create accountability in public-private 
partnerships, it is necessary to look beyond the traditional means. As 
Freeman explains, accountability should be considered in terms of 
“measures that spring not exclusively from top-down oversight by legis-
latures, executive branch agencies, and courts, but from a variety of 
participants—public and private.”219 Partnerships must be carefully de-
signed to ensure that the involvement of private actors does not com-
promise public accountability. 
 Two essential elements for accountability in third-party verification 
are active governmental oversight and transparency. As stated by one 
scholar, government agencies that use private means “should evaluate 
those private means and report on and take responsibility for the re-
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sults.”220 Third-party verifiers should be answerable to and sanctionable 
by the governmental agency for which they are making compliance de-
terminations.221 Active governmental oversight means that agency offi-
cials closely monitor whether verifiers and accreditors are following the 
rules of the program and how the system is functioning, in both formal 
and informal ways. 
 Transparency, in turn, allows the public to oversee the govern-
ment. Transparency means “public disclosure of key decisions and the 
information necessary to assess those decisions.”222 Such disclosure 
places pressure on regulatory agencies to act appropriately because 
their decisions and actions will be subject to public scrutiny.223 As noted 
by another scholar, transparency and public participation are useful 
institutional proxies for accountability.224 
 There are good reasons to be concerned about whether third-
party verification systems will be adequately supervised by the govern-
ment and transparent to the public. The same resource deficiencies 
that limit governmental monitoring of regulated entities in traditional 
social regulation can be expected to limit governmental oversight in 
third-party verification systems.225 Moreover, overseeing a third-party 
verification system will require agencies to develop new capabilities. 
Monitoring the performance of accreditation and verification bodies 
requires different skills than monitoring the activities of regulated enti-
ties themselves.226 Part of the challenge will be one of management—to 
make sure the system is running smoothly and that all parts of it are 
operating as well as possible.227 
 Making third-party verification systems transparent also presents 
challenges. Voluntary regulatory programs and initiatives that rely on 
the auditing industry to conduct inspections have often lacked trans-
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parency.228 In the case of voluntary environmental audits, for example, 
audit reports are rarely made public. Regulated entities have argued for 
and received protection for the confidentiality of the information col-
lected and generated in a voluntary audit.229 Many U.S. states have 
passed audit privilege and immunity laws providing that companies 
need not disclose regulatory violations found in an audit so long as they 
correct the violations in a timely manner.230 In many states, the privilege 
applies not just to the documents that constitute the audit report but 
also to oral testimony about the report’s contents.231 As some scholars 
have observed, these statutes impose a “veil of secrecy over a company’s 
environmental compliance that conflicts with the policy of public disclo-
sure that pervades environmental regulation.”232 Although no audit pri-
vilege and immunity law exists at the federal level, the EPA issued a pol-
icy statement protecting companies that report violations pursuant to 
the policy from audit report disclosure in most situations.233 
 There is also little transparency in the inspection activities of the 
auditors hired by commercial buyers to check on their suppliers.234 It is 
very difficult for consumers and other members of the public to get 
information not only about the harms that arise from the production 
of consumer products but also about the standards buyer firms set for 
their suppliers, how supplier firms enforce those standards, and to what 
extent supplier firms comply.235 A study of social auditors in the cloth-
ing industry found that audit methodology and results are generally 
kept confidential.236 It is unusual for companies to share the results of 
voluntary audits with interested parties such as workers, consumers, or 
environmental groups.237 
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 In voluntary labeling schemes that rely on third-party certification, 
the degree of transparency varies but is often weak. In his study of for-
est certification programs, one scholar states that, although all pro-
grams embrace the value of transparency, public information regarding 
certification inspections is generally limited partly because it is viewed 
as confidential business information that could hurt the firm if made 
public.238 Further, forestry companies may favor certification schemes 
precisely because hiring certifiers may help them avoid “having the 
public or nosy government inspectors intruding into their opera-
tions.”239 Other scholars find that many voluntary environmental pro-
grams operate “behind closed doors” and lack public scrutiny.240 ISO 
14001, the most widespread standard for environmental management 
systems, requires public disclosure of the organization’s environmental 
policy but does not require disclosure of any information related to the 
organization’s environmental performance.241 
 Indeed, the private inspection industry has historically maintained 
strict confidentiality of information provided to them.242 Private audi-
tors have viewed themselves essentially as peer reviewers with the role of 
helping their clients.243 In the accreditation of health care institutions, 
for example, information generated “was for the benefit of the re-
viewed institution and was nobody else’s business.”244 Accreditation bo-
dies such as ANSI also tend to be obscure institutions in the eyes of the 
public.245 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), of 
which ANSI and other national standard-setting bodies are part, does 
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not make its standards publicly available either when they are in devel-
opment or after they are finalized.246 Only members of the ISO are in-
volved in their development, and once standards are finalized, they 
must be purchased for use.247 
 Where third-party verification is used in regulation, strong trans-
parency and accountability should apply. The government and the pub-
lic have a direct interest in the quality and accuracy of the verifica-
tion.248 The government will require information about the activities of 
verification and accreditation bodies to assure their accountability.249 
The public will require information about the roles of all actors in the 
system to keep agencies publicly accountable. The disclosure of infor-
mation about as many aspects of the system as possible should be the 
norm, with only those exceptions necessary for confidential business 
information.250 
 In part, what seems to be required is to change or at least expand 
the “communicative energy” of verification.251 The default in the third-
party assurance industry is for the verifier to address his report to his 
client.252 In many programs that produce audit reports there has been 
a disjuncture between a rich account given to the client and a bland up-
or-down summary opinion given to external parties.253 Where the in-
spection serves regulatory purposes, the regulated entity must provide 
rich information to the agency and the public to meet the demand for 
accountability.254 
 Moreover, the use of third-party verification calls for new forms of 
transparency and public participation. For example, although govern-
ment may not have been transparent in the past about the performance 
of its inspection units or inspectors, it should seek ways to be transparent 
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about the performance of the accreditation and verification bodies in-
volved in regulatory verification. Government might also develop new 
public participation mechanisms like petitions to challenge a verifica-
tion decision or require that accreditation bodies and verification bodies 
submit publicly disclosed reports of their activities each year. 
C. Verifier Independence 
 To render an objective evaluation of a regulated entity’s compli-
ance status, a verifier should be independent of the regulated entity. 
The fact that a verifier must be a third party provides an initial degree 
of independence. The verifier cannot be the regulated entity itself (re-
ferred to as first-party verification or self-verification) or an entity within 
the firm’s industry or business community (referred to as second-party 
verification).255 By definition, a third party is external to—and thus 
formally independent from—the firm.256 
 Yet formal independence does not necessarily ensure objectivity. 
The third-party assurance industry is “rife with potential for abuse” be-
cause the companies subject to evaluation usually arrange and pay for 
inspections.257 Companies seeking positive verification reports have 
incentives to offer payoffs of various kinds, and the third-party verifiers 
have incentives to accept them.258 Also, assuming the existence of a 
market in verifier services, companies have the opportunity to shop 
around for a favorable verifier and put pressure on verifiers for a favor-
able outcome.259 
 Past crises in financial accounting have highlighted the difficulty of 
ensuring auditor independence under these conditions.260 In the sav-
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ings-and-loan crisis of the late 1980s, accredited financial auditors failed 
to identify serious financial irregularities.261 In Enron’s 2001 collapse, 
auditor failure was also implicated and Enron’s auditor, Arthur Ander-
son, went out of business soon after.262 Despite formal independence, 
financial auditors have sometimes distorted numbers in ways that mask 
a company’s true financial condition. 
 The literature on financial accounting has recognized that uncon-
scious biases as well as conscious motivations can affect an auditor’s 
judgment. As some argue, three structural aspects of accounting create 
substantial opportunities for unconscious bias.263 First, accounting 
standards are often ambiguous and “[b]ias thrives wherever there is the 
possibility of interpreting information in different ways.”264 Second, an 
“attachment bias” results from the fact that the auditor has strong busi-
ness reasons to please the client and equates his own interests with 
those of the client.265 Third, an “approval bias” kicks in where an audi-
tor is asked to approve a company’s numbers rather than arrive at these 
numbers independently.266 Moreover, human nature makes auditors 
more apt to harm the faceless investor than the familiar client and to 
discount the future negative consequences of giving an undeserved 
positive audit opinion more than the immediate negative consequences 
of not doing so.267 
 Conceptualized differently, the problem of auditor independence 
in the financial sector stems from the auditor having two masters: the 
client and the shareholders.268 Working on behalf of the client, the audi-
tor is expected to be a “certifier” that accepts and approves the financial 
information the client puts forward for disclosure to the public.269 The 
public, on the other hand, expects the auditor to act as a “detective” 
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who rigorously assesses the information and discovers any problems with 
it. The same problem has been observed in voluntary certification 
schemes. Third-party certifiers “are thus placed in an inherently difficult 
position, since they are in effect public fiduciaries employed by the very 
private actors whose activities they are supposed to assess and moni-
tor.”270 In some situations, financial auditors and third-party certifiers 
are so eager to serve their clients that they engage in “creative compli-
ance” to help their client find ways to formally comply with rules while 
achieving ends the rules were intended to prevent.271 
 The problem of auditor independence in financial audits is exac-
erbated when auditing firms provide their clients with additional “non-
audit” consulting and tax services.272 As providers of these services, au-
dit firms are even more likely to equate their interests with those of the 
client. In addition, if the audit firm displeases the client in a financial 
audit, it may lose not just the audit engagement but the additional 
business as well. On the other hand, the practice of co-supplying audit 
and non-audit services is very common and allows beneficial “knowl-
edge spillovers” as the auditor brings knowledge of the client’s business 
from one engagement to the next.273 
 The same issues of auditor and certifier independence can be ex-
pected to appear in systems of third-party verification. Verifiers, like fi-
nancial auditors, have pecuniary interests and unconscious biases that 
make them favor their clients. Also, the verifier has two masters with dif-
ferent interests. The regulated entity wants the verifier to confirm and 
approve the data it puts forward to show compliance. The regulator 
wants the verifier to carefully and objectively examine the data. Verifiers, 
too, might be tempted to help clients engage in creative compliance. 
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And unless prohibited, verifiers would likely seek non-verification work 
from their verification clients that may result in conflicts of interest. 
 The primary counterargument to concerns about auditor objectiv-
ity is that third parties that fail to be objective will develop bad reputa-
tions and fail to attract new clients.274 Moreover, auditors that lack ob-
jectivity may ultimately be deaccredited by an oversight organization, if 
one exists, and unable to market their services. Without clients or lack-
ing accreditation, they will go out of business. 
 Unfortunately, the empirical evidence from the financial industry 
does not strongly support this contention. The evidence suggests instead 
that third parties may indeed shirk their responsibility to be objective 
despite risks to their reputation.275 As one scholar explains with regard 
to the financial accounting industry, the “immediate and future payoffs 
to the auditors from cooperating with management in questionable ac-
counting practices exceed the discounted possibility of judgments and 
sanctions.”276 In other words, the benefits of shirking are definite and 
immediate while the drawbacks are contingent and delayed. 
 A variety of reforms have been proposed to promote auditor inde-
pendence in financial accounting. Some recommend a three-pronged 
reform.277 First, auditing firms should be prohibited from providing 
any additional consulting or tax services to the companies they audit.278 
Second, financial auditors should have fixed, limited contract periods 
during which they cannot be terminated and contractual provisions 
cannot be changed.279 Moreover, there would be a mandatory rotation 
of audit firms as clients would be prohibited from rehiring the same 
auditing firm at the end of the contract.280 Finally, auditors would be 
barred from taking jobs with the firms they audit for at least five 
years.281 At least one commentator has advocated that the pretension of 
auditor independence be abandoned and that the Securities and Ex-
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change Commission repeal the regulation that requires that annual 
reports be independently audited.282 
 The independence problem may be somewhat easier to address in 
third-party verification systems for regulatory compliance. Many of the 
deficiencies in the independence of auditors in the financial account-
ing industry result from the lack of a strong, governmentally sanc-
tioned system of rules and standards to regulate the accreditation of 
auditors and the practice of auditing.283 A strong regulatory system can 
make and enforce rules regarding accreditation and reaccreditation 
requirements, the mandatory rotation of verifiers, and restrictions on 
side consulting. In addition, the presence of an effective regulatory 
body can do a great deal to make the loss of a good reputation a more 
definite and immediate threat. With the presence of strong oversight by 
a regulatory agency, the third-party verifier is likely to feel the strength 
of this other master. 
 It is also possible that, in regulatory fields requiring technical ex-
pertise, verifiers may empathize with the goals of social regulation and 
the regulatory agencies that administer it. In other words, in some cases 
the verifier might have a certain built-in respect for and interest in 
pleasing this master. More generally, verifiers as an industry might un-
derstand that their field of work issues from the regulatory agency’s 
decision to rely on a third-party verification system, and they might 
want the regulatory agency to have confidence that a third-party verifi-
cation system is valuable and trustworthy in this capacity. The industry 
might thus develop certain self-regulating mechanisms that encourage 
and promote the objectivity of verifications.284 
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D. Verifier Competence 
 Audit quality arguably depends mostly on two factors: auditor in-
dependence and auditor competence.285 In the context of regulatory 
compliance, the competence of third-party verifiers should be at least 
comparable to the competence of regulatory agency inspectors. Third-
party verifiers should possess both technical expertise and professional 
judgment.286 
 In some ways, a third-party verification system would have advan-
tages in promoting competence over a traditional government inspec-
torate. As highlighted above, such a system could draw upon the exper-
tise that already exists in the private sector.287 Agencies could establish a 
variety of rules to ensure that verifiers possess certain skills and abilities. 
Verifiers would have to meet the requirements of an accreditation sys-
tem and periodically be reaccredited. Oversight activities could check 
the performance of verifiers in real time. Where verifiers fail, deac-
creditation would be a remedy. Deaccreditation of an incompetent veri-
fier would likely be much easier to accomplish than dismissal of an in-
competent governmental inspector. 
 A contested issue has been the extent to which the skill set of the 
general accountant translates to regulatory auditing fields. Financial 
accounting firms have, for example, suggested that they are well situ-
ated to serve as environmental auditors.288 They have pointed out that 
financial and environmental audits are alike in that both seek to verify 
compliance against standards and utilize standardized methodologies 
and auditing techniques.289 On the other hand, financial accountants 
generally lack expertise in other relevant areas such as environmental 
science and environmental law. One scholar raises the concern that as 
environmental compliance becomes more like accounting, accountants 
will enter the field and scientific expertise will be subordinated to au-
diting expertise.290 
 Another scholar’s observations of two garment factory audits in 
Asia illustrate how accountants may not be competent to perform social 
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audits.291 The auditors he studied were financial accountants from a 
major global firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, who had received short-
term training in social auditing.292 According to these observations, the 
resulting audit reports “glossed over problems with freedom of associa-
tion and collective bargaining, overlooked serious violations of health 
and safety standards, and failed to report common problems in wages 
and hours.”293 As noted in an investigative report by an advocacy group 
in the garment sector, the vast majority of social audits are conducted 
by global firms whose staff is generally unskilled and inexperienced at 
social auditing.294 
 A related concern is that third-party verification might be reduced 
to mere checklists that are mechanically applied and fail to capture the 
true compliance situation of a regulated entity.295 In the checklist mod-
el of auditing, the audit “is carried out based on a formal checklist, 
which is executed point by point by the auditor.”296 Designed to pro-
mote standardization and uniformity in the audit, checklists may give 
insufficient attention to the particularities of different sectors and fa-
cilities.297 A more flexible and tailored alternative is risk-based auditing 
in which the auditor determines which activities being audited present 
the greatest risk of error and fraud, and he then focuses his attention 
on those activities.298 
 Verifiers might also seek to rely on proxies for compliance that are 
easy to observe. One discussion of compliance audits in Australia notes 
that compliance audits are often focused on “the [management] sys-
tems elements of the compliance program, rather than its compliance 
performance.”299 Instead of gathering information about how compli-
ance processes actually work, many auditors relied primarily on existing 
documentation of the management system and interviews of senior 
management.300 
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 Another dynamic that undermines a competent audit is the ten-
dency of auditors who are paid a set fee to minimize their audit costs.301 
One scholar found that auditors of Asian garment factories spent about 
one day in each factory, with a factory floor inspection lasting only thir-
ty or forty-five minutes and that the required worker interviews were 
often conducted incompletely and with haste.302 The advocacy group’s 
report on garment industry audits concluded that “[s]ocial audits are 
usually too short, too superficial and too sloppy to identify certain types 
of code violations.”303 
E. Costs to Government and Regulated Entities 
 Third-party verification holds promise for reducing the govern-
mental cost of regulating by shifting costs to industry. It does not, how-
ever, eliminate all costs to the government, and it imposes new costs on 
industry. An important question is whether third-party verification is 
more cost-effective than direct governmental monitoring. This Section 
analyzes these cost-related considerations. 
 Although there may be a shifting of costs with third-party verifica-
tion, government still incurs a variety of administrative costs. These 
costs include implementing and enforcing the many rules and stan-
dards pertaining to the third-party system itself. As detailed below, 
those rules would relate to how verifiers are accredited, how regulated 
entities select verifiers, how verifications are performed, and how veri-
fiers and regulated entities report and disclose information. 
 Governmental oversight of third-party verification may entail sub-
stantial costs. The government will need, in essence, to audit the verifi-
ers and their verifications. It can do this in a variety of ways, including 
inspecting verifiers, accompanying verifiers on their inspections of re-
gulated entities, and conducting independent inspections of regulated 
entities. The cost associated with accrediting and overseeing verifiers 
may be reduced when the regulatory agency delegates this task to an 
accreditation body. The accreditation body could receive, process, and 
respond to verifier applications. Also, the agency may be able to out-
source some oversight tasks by requiring that accreditation bodies mon-
itor the verifiers that they accredit. 
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 To the extent that costs shift from the government to the regulated 
community, an important question is how high these costs will be.304 
Private regulatory inspection services may be costly—so much so that 
regulated entities given the choice of whether to be audited by a third 
party or inspected by a regulatory agency might well choose the lat-
ter.305 Moreover, as one scholar discusses, the costs of privatization may 
grow in proportion to the extent to which the private actors playing 
public roles must abide by public norms, such as due process and over-
sight.306 In more concrete terms, hiring third-party verifiers is likely to 
be cheaper for regulated entities if those third-party verifiers are not 
required to do things such as prepare reports of their activities and re-
spond to information requests from the government and the public 
about particular verified facilities. Yet such costs may be necessary to 
the accountability of a third-party verification system. 
 A troubling aspect of imposing additional costs on regulated enti-
ties is the potentially disproportionate effect on small businesses.307 
Larger firms are likely to have more internal resources to understand 
and respond to these new requirements than small firms. A similar dy-
namic has been observed with voluntary labeling programs that require 
third-party certification. For example, small agricultural producers may 
find it too costly to certify organic, and forestry operations in develop-
ing countries may find it too costly to certify with the Forest Steward-
ship Council.308 Mechanisms to subsidize the third-party verification 
costs of smaller companies may be necessary, which could add to the 
governmental costs of the program.309 
 Finally, the use of third-party verification may not be cost-effective. 
Regulation is cost-effective if it produces a given level of benefit, or the 
                                                                                                                      
304 In promulgating the California Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule, the California Air 
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308 See Richard N.L. Andrews, Environmental Regulation and Business “Self-Regulation,” 31 
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some larger firms with large benefits at stake but may be prohibitive for smaller firms”). 
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desired regulatory outcome, at the least cost for governmental agencies 
and regulated entities.310 Privatization of governmental functions is of-
ten justified on the basis of being cost-effective. Privatizations of schools, 
prisons, and other government services are undergirded by the idea 
that private actors can generate higher-quality outcomes at the same or 
lower cost because they have greater flexibility in running their opera-
tions and are subject to competition.311 To maximize profits, they are 
driven to innovate in ways that lower costs or improve service quality.312 
 Third-party verification may not initially appear to be more cost-
effective than traditional forms of social regulation. Indeed, third-party 
verification may prove to be more costly overall than having govern-
mental officials inspect and determine compliance. It may still be cost-
effective, however, if it provides a higher level of benefits than the pre-
sent regulatory system and if those benefits are desired.313 As argued 
above, compliance is often only infrequently assessed and regulatory 
failure is common. Moreover, agencies are ill-equipped to collect the 
kinds of data needed to effectively implement new forms of regula-
tion.314 Third-party verification would arguably lead to better informa-
tion and regulatory outcomes that would justify its additional costs. 
With the efficiencies promoted by competition, third-party verification 
seems likely to be more cost-effective than adding the government ca-
pacity that would be necessary to provide the same level of regulatory 
outcomes. 
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311 See Freeman, supra note 16, at 1296–97; Minow, supra note 16, at 1242–43. 
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IV. Regulation of Third-Party Verification 
 This Article has argued that there are a variety of reasons both to 
endorse and be concerned about third-party verification as a regulatory 
approach. In general, however, whether a certain form of privatization 
deserves support will depend on whether it is structured in a manner 
that delivers the promised benefits of privatization while preserving 
public values. As one scholar explains, the trend toward public-private 
partnerships in the provision of public services is “undeniable,” and 
“[s]keptics should not simply decry this reality, but deal with it by de-
manding public accountability.”315 According to another scholar, in-
struments for extending public norms to private actors are plentiful, 
including “direct regulation, conditioned funding, contract, and tort 
liability, among other things.”316 The task that remains, then, is to ex-
amine how third-party verification can be structured to reap its benefits 
while avoiding problems. 
 This Part recommends and analyzes an approach of direct regula-
tion of third-party verification that responds to the important concerns 
highlighted above about accountability, verifier independence and 
competence, and costs. It recommends that regulatory agencies that 
incorporate third-party verification into their regulatory programs es-
tablish clear and enforceable rules about the accreditation of verifiers, 
the selection of verifiers by regulated entities, the performance of veri-
fications, and the disclosure and reporting of verification information. 
It also urges strong regulatory oversight of the system and attentiveness 
to issues of cost-effectiveness. Examples are drawn primarily from the 
California Air Resources Board’s Regulation for the Mandatory Report-
ing of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, which is the most rigorously regu-
lated system of third-party verification yet established. When helpful, 
examples from other third-party verification and certification programs 
are also discussed. 
A. Accreditation Rules 
 A system of accreditation for verifiers regulates who may work as a 
verifier. It establishes a minimum level of training and expertise, thus 
responding directly to concerns about competence. The possibility of 
deaccreditation also allows the agency to sanction verifiers, which serves 
the goal of accountability. 
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 A key design question regarding accreditation is whether the gov-
ernment agency should itself accredit verification bodies or, instead, 
delegate this task to an accreditation body. With governmental accredi-
tation, the agency controls who can act as a verification body. Alterna-
tively, the agency could approve or recognize an accreditation body to 
assess candidate qualifications and make accreditation decisions. The 
regulatory agency could still establish the basic requirements and pro-
cedures for accreditation, or it might allow the accreditation agency to 
do so with an opportunity for agency approval. The agency might also 
choose to approve more than one accreditation body. 
 As part of the accreditation rules, a regulatory agency may require 
that its accreditation and verification bodies abide by relevant interna-
tional standards or maintain membership in relevant international in-
dustry associations.317 For accreditation bodies, the ISO published 
standard is ISO/IEC 17011, “Conformity assessment: General require-
ments for accreditation bodies accrediting conformity assessment bod-
ies.”318 This standard establishes a uniform set of requirements that 
could be made applicable to the entities charged with accrediting veri-
fication bodies.319 
 Appropriate requirements for verification bodies may be found in 
ISO/IEC Guide 65, “General requirements for bodies operating prod-
uct certification systems.”320 Guide 65 includes requirements that a cer-
tification (or verification) body should, for example, operate in a non-
discriminatory manner; take measures to ensure its independence from 
client firms; and have a legally enforceable agreement for the provision 
of services to client firms.321 With specific applicability to greenhouse 
gas emissions verification bodies, ISO has developed ISO 14065:2007, 
“Greenhouse gases—Requirements for greenhouse gas validation and 
                                                                                                                      
317 See, e.g., Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Laboratories for the EnergyStar Program, 
supra note 128, at 1 (requiring Energy Star accredited laboratories to maintain accredita-
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verification bodies for use in accreditation or other forms of recogni-
tion,”322 and ISO 14066:2011, “Greenhouse gases—Competence re-
quirements for greenhouse gas validation teams and verification 
teams.”323 The ISO 14065 standard specifies accreditation requirements 
for verification bodies that verify organizations’ assertions or claims 
about the quantity of their greenhouse gas emissions.324 ISO 14066 sets 
standards for the competence of greenhouse gas verification teams that 
can be used by companies, regulators, and verification bodies in assem-
bling or evaluating such a team.325 
 The ARB directly accredits individual verifiers and verification bod-
ies.326 To become an individual verifier, the ARB requires a minimum 
education background that includes a bachelor’s degree in “science, 
technology, business, statistics, mathematics, environmental policy, eco-
nomics, or financial auditing” or sufficient relevant experience.327 The 
applicant must have a minimum of two years of professional work ex-
perience in “emissions data management, emissions technology, emis-
sions field enforcement, or other technical skills necessary to conduct 
verification.”328 An applicant must also complete a verification training 
course and receive a passing score on the exit exam.329 Applicants qual-
ify as “lead verifiers” if they meet the basic requirements and have also 
worked as a lead verifier in another greenhouse gas emissions reporting 
program, such as the California Climate Action Registry, or possess 
equivalent expertise.330 Applicants may also qualify as sector-specific ve-
rifiers if they meet the basic requirements and complete a sector-specific 
training course offered by the ARB.331 
 Firms may apply to the ARB to become accredited verification bo-
dies. For accreditation, the firm must have at least five full-time staff, 
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including at least two accredited lead verifiers.332 The firm must also 
show that it has at least one million dollars in liability insurance, poli-
cies to prevent conflicts of interest, and plans to support verification-
related staff technical training.333 Local air pollution agencies within 
California may also apply to become verification bodies. They need on-
ly show that they have at least two accredited lead verifiers on staff and 
that they have policies to prevent conflicts of interest.334 California’s 
accreditation program was developed using international best practices 
as laid out in ISO 14065 and ISO 14066.335 
 In the EU ETS, the process for accrediting verifiers varies by mem-
ber state. Some member states have governmental accreditation bodies 
while others use private accreditation bodies.336 Member states also 
have different policies regarding whether verifiers accredited by a dif-
ferent member state may conduct verifications within the state.337 In 
establishing their procedures, member states commonly refer to Euro-
pean standard EN45011, which is equivalent to ISO/IEC Guide 65, and 
associated guidance documents issued by the European Co-operation 
of Accreditation (ECA), a non-profit association of accreditation bodies 
recognized by member states.338 
 In the Energy Star program, the EPA relies extensively on interna-
tional standards and external accreditation bodies. Energy Star certifi-
cation bodies must maintain accreditation under ISO/IEC Guide 65, 
and this accreditation should be conducted by a member of the Inter-
national Accreditation Forum (IAF) operating in accordance with 
ISO/IEC 17011.339 Under the EPA rules, EPA-recognized certifiers 
must also meet other conditions, such as demonstrating adequate staff, 
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maintaining records, allowing EPA audits, and participating in meet-
ings with the EPA.340 The labs that test products for Energy Star must 
be accredited by an EPA-recognized accreditation body that operates its 
accreditation program in accordance with ISO/IEC 17011 and main-
tains an affiliation with the International Laboratory Accreditation Co-
operation (ILAC).341 The EPA’s Watersense program specifies similar 
requirements for its certification and accreditation bodies.342 
B. Verifier Selection Rules 
 A regulatory agency may also establish rules specifying when and 
how regulated entities may select an accredited verifier. Verifier selec-
tion rules ensure that the verifiers selected have the necessary expertise 
and independence to conduct a particular verification. 
 In its greenhouse gas reporting rule, the ARB requires the forma-
tion of a verification team.343 The team must include at least two lead 
verifiers employed by the same verification body.344 One is needed to 
conduct the verification and another to conduct an independent review 
of the verification.345 The team may also include additional accredited 
and non-accredited technical and administrative staff.346 For verifica-
tions at refineries, hydrogen plants, and cement plants, a sector-specific 
verifier must be part of the team.347 The ARB restricts the extent to 
which verifiers can use subcontractors, specifying that neither the lead 
verifier nor the independent reviewer may be subcontracted.348 
 ARB has also developed rules to police conflicts of interest that 
verifiers may have in performing certain audits. As defined by ARB, a 
conflict of interest means “a situation in which, because of financial or 
other activities or relationships with other persons or organizations, a 
person or body is unable or potentially unable to render an impartial 
verification opinion.”349 The ARB requires that verifiers that seek to be 
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contracted by a particular regulated entity submit a self-evaluation of 
potential conflicts of interest to the ARB at least forty-five days before 
commencing a verification.350 
 In the self-evaluation, verifiers must reveal the nature of any ser-
vices previously provided to the regulated entity by any member of the 
verification team and any other potentially relevant past, present, or fu-
ture relationships.351 The verifier uses criteria provided by the regula-
tion to rate the conflict of interest as high, medium, or low.352 In the 
case of a medium conflict of interest, the verifier must submit a mitiga-
tion plan to the ARB for the verification to move forward.353 The veri-
fier must also monitor potential conflicts of interest and report them to 
ARB throughout the period of the verification and for a year after-
wards.354 For example, the verifier would have to report to the ARB if a 
member of the verification team conducts any consulting for or be-
comes employed by the regulated entity within a year after the verifica-
on
within the scope of verification services, but any specific recommenda-
                                                                                                                     
ti .355 
 Moreover, the ARB’s conflict-of-interest rules require that verifiers 
refrain from any consulting during a verification. The verifier’s respon-
sibility is only to review emissions information.356 The verifier must 
identify issues and errors in the emissions data report, but cannot con-
sult on how to make changes to the data collection systems.357 Verifiers 
should, for example, identify areas in which accuracy could be im-
proved, but they are not permitted to consult on how to improve.358 As 
the ARB states, “[i]dentifying weaknesses or areas of improvement is 
 
cal Guidance], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghgver/revised_verifica 
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coi_novs.doc (scroll down and click hyperlink to “COI/NOVS form” under “Archived Infor-
mation”) (last visited Dec. 28, 2011). 
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tion for remedying these would constitute consulting services and cre-
ate a conflict of interest.”359 
 Finally, the ARB has a mandatory verifier rotation rule that re-
quires regulated entities to change their verification body at least once 
every six years.360 The ARB explains that this requirement prevents veri-
fiers from becoming too comfortable and familiar with a client’s data 
reports and avoids conflict-of-interest issues that arise in a long-term 
business relationship.361 
C. Verification Performance Rules 
 By providing rules about how to perform verifications, a regulatory 
agency can exert great influence over the work of verifiers and the 
quality of verifications. Verification performance rules can frame and 
structure the verification and its outputs in ways that help ensure that 
they serve regulatory goals.362 
 The primary issue in fashioning verification rules is how detailed 
to make them. Detailed rules further the goals of consistency and qual-
ity by helping to ensure that verifications are performed in a similar 
and complete manner. Detail also reduces ambiguity, thereby limiting 
opportunities for bias. Detailed rules may, however, lead to the problem 
of “going by the book,” wherein rules are applied that may not be suit-
able or appropriate with potentially unfair or wasteful implications.363 
Stated differently, the issue involves how much the agency should pre-
scribe and how much the agency should leave to the verifier’s profes-
sional judgment. Arguments on either side would be similar to those 
that have been made in the past regarding how much discretion should 
be given to government inspectors.364 
 The ARB prescribes in detail how verifications should be per-
formed. The rule requires the verifier to prepare a verification plan 
that, at the minimum, includes the dates of proposed meetings and 
interviews with entity representatives; the dates of proposed site visits; 
proposed document and data reviews; and the expected date of com-
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pletion of verification.365 The rule also requires that an accredited veri-
fier on the verification team make a site visit.366 On the site visit, the 
verifier must ensure that all regulated emissions sources at the site are 
included in the emissions data report; learn about the data manage-
ment systems used to process emissions information; and collect and 
review any other information deemed necessary.367 Entities must collect 
and maintain information related to their emissions in a clear, trans-
parent and complete manner,368 and make all relevant information 
available to the verification team.369 
 The ARB instructs verifiers to use a risk-based approach to verifica-
tion, in which the verifier strategically analyzes where risks of material 
misstatements exist and focuses its activities accordingly.370 To this end, 
verifiers are required to prepare a sampling plan that contains a rank-
ing of emissions sources by amount of emissions; a ranking of emissions 
sources by the presence of calculation uncertainty; and a qualitative 
narrative that synthesizes the information in the rankings and details 
specific risks.371 The rule also requires that verifiers use “data checks” to 
ensure that emissions have been calculated in the manner specified by 
the regulation.372 In other words, the verifier does not duplicate all the 
emissions calculations made by the regulated entity, but rather chooses 
certain calculations to check based on its sampling plan. 
 The rule allows regulated entities to improve or correct their emis-
sions data reports in the course of verification.373 In guidance, the ARB 
makes it clear that many issues that the verifier may find can be cor-
rected before the verification deadline and a positive opinion can be 
issued.374 Some issues, such as a failure by the regulated entity to collect 
necessary data, would not be correctable and would necessarily result 
in an adverse opinion.375 
 California also requires an “independent review” of the verification 
before it is submitted.376 The independent reviewer is part of the verifi-
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cation team and must be a lead verifier employed by the accreditation 
body.377 The independent reviewer may not participate in the site visit 
or otherwise be actively involved in the verification.378 The review 
serves as a “final check” for errors in planning, data sampling, and 
judgments by the verification team.379 
y.390 
                                                                                                                     
 Some aspects of the audit process are inevitably left to professional 
judgment.380 The rule defines professional judgment as “the ability to 
render sound decisions based on professional qualifications and rele-
vant greenhouse gas accounting experience.”381 In guidance, ARB spe-
cifically recognizes that professional judgment is required of verifiers in 
collecting and reviewing information needed for verification and in 
deciding how many data checks are necessary.382 
 The European Commission specifies a verification methodology 
consisting of five steps.383 The first two steps are strategic analysis and 
risk analysis, in which the verifier reviews documents and other infor-
mation from the regulated entity to determine the scope and complex-
ity of the verification and the areas of greatest risk.384 The verifier then 
writes a verification plan that establishes a timeline for the verification 
and includes a data sampling plan.385 The third step is the verification 
itself, which may or may not include a site visit.386 Fourth, the verifier 
prepares an internal verification report that records and reviews all evi-
dence collected and sets forth the verification opinion.387 This internal 
verification report should also facilitate “a potential evaluation of the 
audit by the [member state regulatory agency] and accreditation 
body.”388 Finally, the verifier submits a verification report to the regu-
lated entity that contains the verification methodology, findings, and 
opinion.389 The regulated entity then submits this report with its an-
nual emissions report to the member state regulatory agenc
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D. Reporting and Disclosure Rules 
 A regulatory agency may also establish rules regarding the types of 
information that accreditation bodies, verification bodies, and regu-
lated entities must report to the government. These rules should en-
sure that the government has access to all the information it requires to 
effectively oversee the third-party verification system.391 These rules can 
also facilitate the disclosure of information to the public. As a general 
rule, the public should have access to at least the same types of infor-
mation it would have about regulated entities under traditional social 
regulation as well as additional information about verification and ac-
creditation bodies. Well-crafted disclosure rules can promote account-
ability and transparency. 
 The reporting required of regulated entities in third-party verifica-
tion could resemble the self-reporting currently required under many 
regulatory laws. For example, the Clean Water Act requires polluters to 
regularly self-monitor and report their discharges.392 The difference 
with third-party verification is that these self-monitoring reports would 
be verified by a third party. 
 Verifiers in such a system could be subject to a variety of reporting 
requirements. In addition to the positive or adverse determination itself, 
verifiers might be required to submit documents generated during the 
verification process to explain and support their determinations. The 
government might also require certain types of information from verifi-
ers to conduct oversight during the course of the verification. As de-
scribed above, verifiers could be required to report potential conflicts of 
interest before the verification begins. Verifiers might also be required 
to report the dates and times of specific verification activities so that 
government officials can accompany the verifier for oversight purposes. 
 Accreditation bodies, in turn, could be required to report regard-
ing the processes used to accredit verifiers. In addition to reporting ac-
creditation decisions, they could be required to provide the govern-
ment with a report containing the information collected to support the 
accreditation decision. They might also report areas of weakness that 
raised concern, even if they did not preclude accreditation. 
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 As in traditional social regulation, compliance information col-
lected by the government should generally be made available to the 
public. Exceptions would apply to protect confidential commercial or 
financial information.393 In a third-party verification system, this would 
include reporting not just by regulated entities but also by verifiers and 
accreditors. Government agencies should also provide the public with 
user-friendly information about the responsibilities and qualifications 
of verifiers and accreditors.394 
 A system of third-party verification has great potential to produce 
greater transparency about compliance rates and regulatory perform-
ance. Because compliance will be more regularly and systematically as-
sessed, statistics of compliance rates and comparisons of compliance 
among regulated entities will be more meaningful. Also, the actual data 
regarding regulatory performance will be verified by a third party and 
thus more reliable and useful in calculating the social impact of the 
regulated activity. 
 For example, if third-party verification were used on an annual 
basis to verify discharge monitoring reports under the Clean Water Act, 
and if the compliance data and verification determinations were made 
public, reliable information would be easily available about how many 
entities were in compliance that year, how similar facilities compared, 
and how much pollution had been discharged by any given group of 
polluters. As under the TRI, the government could facilitate such pub-
lic disclosure by requiring regulated entities and verifiers to report in a 
computerized and standardized format.395 Such reliable information, 
provided in an accessible format via the Internet, has great potential to 
impact citizens, consumers, and investors in ways that reinforce regula-
tory goals.396 
 Under the California greenhouse gas emissions reporting rule, 
regulated entities are responsible for submitting an emissions data re-
port to the ARB, and verifiers are thereafter responsible for submitting 
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a positive or adverse verification opinion to the ARB . Both submissions 
become public information.397 The verifier is also responsible for pre-
paring several other documents to which the regulatory agency has ac-
cess. Most importantly, the verifier is responsible for providing the 
regulated entity with a detailed verification report that summarizes the 
activities conducted by the verification team and findings that support 
the verification opinion.398 Although the primary audience of the veri-
fication report is the regulated firm, the ARB states that it will look at 
the report “when conducting audits of verification bodies and when 
resolving issues that arose during verification.”399 
 The ARB also instructs the verifier to keep an “issues log” that ul-
timately becomes part of the verification report. In the issues log, veri-
fiers should note any issues that are not serious enough to necessitate 
an adverse opinion but may be indicative of emissions reporting prob-
lems.400 For example, verifiers should note failures of record keeping; 
errors in the emissions data report; and other observed reporting 
weaknesses.401 As the ARB explains, “The issues log is an important part 
of the ‘evidence trail,’ which supports the verification findings, in-
creases transparency for the independent reviewer and ARB, and will 
be relied upon if there are disputes with operators over the verification 
findings.”402 California, however, does not seek to make verifiers the 
eyes and ears of the government in all ways. Verifiers are not required 
to report unrelated breaches of environmental law to the govern-
ment.403 Also, if a verifier thinks a regulated entity has knowingly sub-
mitted false information, the ARB instructs the verifier to first contact 
the regulated entity to try to resolve the matter.404 
 The Energy Star program provides an example of reporting re-
quirements for accreditation bodies. In addition to reporting in ways 
that show that they meet the requirements for approval, the entities 
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that accredit Energy Star laboratories must meet with the EPA as re-
quested to brief the EPA on their activities and to report any major 
changes in legal or ownership status; organization and management; 
policies and procedures; and any other matters that might affect their 
capacity.405 Upon request, accreditation bodies must also provide the 
EPA with electronic copies of information about any laboratory, includ-
ing corrective action plans and documents relating to the resolution of 
any deficiencies.406 
E. Governmental Oversight and Enforcement 
 The government should actively enforce its third-party verification 
system rules and otherwise oversee the system to ensure accountabil-
ity.407 An adequate oversight regime would likely include governmental 
audits of particular verifications and accreditations. The government 
might also require an accreditation body to audit a certain number of 
verification bodies each year. The resources for this could come from 
the accreditation fees paid by verifiers and thus be built into the sys-
tem.408 Oversight would need to be attentive to the possibility of crea-
tive compliance, with efforts to identify and close off any loopholes 
found by creative verifiers.409 
 The government agency should also retain independent enforce-
ment capability and impose sanctions as deemed necessary to respond 
to noncompliance. In principle, the same enforcement strategies and 
tools typical to traditional social regulation would apply in a third-party 
verification system. The government would retain the authority to im-
pose fines and other sanctions on noncompliant regulated entities, and 
it should gain new authority to impose fines and other sanctions on 
noncompliant verifiers and accreditors. At a minimum, the govern-
ment agency would have the authority to revoke the accreditation of 
verifiers and the approval of accreditors. 
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 Another important means of creating accountability is establishing 
procedures for citizens, public interest groups, and regulated entities to 
challenge decisions that they believe are contrary to law.410 Interested 
parties have these types of rights in the regulatory process at present, 
and a third-party verification system should contain comparable ac-
countability mechanisms. For example, the citizen suit should continue 
to be available either to compel a regulatory agency to perform a non-
discretionary duty or to directly enforce the law against a regulated en-
tity. A possible mechanism for enhanced citizen oversight in a third-
party verification system is a “challenge rule” that enables interested 
parties to administratively challenge a positive verification. 
 Under the California greenhouse gas reporting rule, the ARB has 
exercised oversight of verification bodies through audits. Verification 
audits include a review of the verification report and sampling plan, 
and may also include observations of the verifier during a site visit. ARB 
states that its verification audits are to ensure “quality, rigor and consis-
tency across verification bodies.”411 The ARB has authority to assess 
fines and other sanctions on verification bodies as well as to rescind 
their accreditation.412 After auditing all verification bodies in 2010, the 
ARB concluded that “verifiers exceeded expectations and provided 
high quality verification services” in almost all cases.413 The ARB identi-
fied a few verification bodies as needing improvement in preparing for 
site visits, maintaining their objectivity during verifications, and provid-
ing detailed verification reports.414 
 The ARB has stated that adverse opinions by verifiers do not always 
lead to enforcement actions against regulated entities.415 Rather, ad-
verse opinions are evaluated on a case-by-case basis and the ARB will 
“work with” regulated entities to rectify the issues.416 Also, if the verifier 
and regulated entity have a dispute, the regulated entity may petition 
the ARB to make a final decision on the verifiability of the emissions 
data report.417 
 In the Energy Star program, the EPA has delegated some aspects 
of oversight to its accreditation and certification bodies while retaining 
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others. Accreditation bodies must conduct ongoing oversight of the 
labs they accredit through regular review of documents to monitor 
their impartiality.418 To allow EPA oversight, the accreditation bodies 
are subject to a variety of reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
and must allow the EPA to witness laboratory testing assessments at its 
discretion.419 The certification bodies that certify products for the En-
ergy Star label are required to annually test at least ten percent of their 
certified product models to ensure they continue to meet standards.420 
Certification bodies, in turn, are subject to reporting and record keep-
ing requirements and must allow the EPA to audit product certification 
and verification activities at its discretion.421 Certification bodies must 
also establish procedures for and conduct “challenge testing,” which 
allows companies to challenge their competitors’ compliance with En-
ergy Star.422 
F. Cost-Effectiveness 
 To respond to concerns about the cost-effectiveness of third-party 
verification, two questions should be considered. First, in which regula-
tory regimes should third-party verification be used? Second, how can 
third-party verification be more cost-effective in those regimes? 
 Third-party verification is not likely to be cost-effective in all social 
regulatory programs. The relevant criterion is whether the additional 
benefits that third-party verification provides outweigh the additional 
costs. This is likely to be the case for regulatory regimes in which the 
government is ill-equipped to collect the compliance information 
needed to run the program. California’s greenhouse gas reporting 
rules and the imported food programs of the FDA are examples. Yet 
this criterion might also be met in traditional regulatory areas such as 
water pollution, worker health and safety, grazing allotments, and oth-
ers. As discussed above, a wide variety of benefits accrue from having 
better information about compliance and regulatory performance. 
 Once a determination is made to use third-party verification, many 
options may be considered to minimize its costs. An important factor in 
reducing costs for regulated entities is the presence of a competitive 
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market in verification services. If the accreditation is too difficult to at-
tain or poorly administered, verifiers could be scarce and regulated en-
tities may have trouble securing verification services in a timely fashion 
and at a reasonable cost. Also, if the bar for conflicts of interest is too 
high, potential verifiers may not want to offer verification services be-
cause doing so would eliminate too many other business opportunities. 
This situation calls for a balancing of interests. The rigor of the accredi-
tation and conflict-of-interest rules must be balanced with the need to 
create sufficiently attractive market opportunities for verifiers. Similarly, 
where rotation of audit firms is required, the period of rotation can be 
chosen to balance concerns about auditor independence and cost-
effectiveness. The six-year period used by California seems to be an ex-
ample of such balancing. 
 Verification performance rules should also take into account cost-
effectiveness. California, for example, does not require a full verifica-
tion each year. Smaller emitters, such as cement plants and general sta-
tionary combustion facilities, are only required to have their reports 
verified every three years.423 Although larger emitters, such as petro-
leum refineries and fossil-fuel fired power plants, must have their re-
ports verified every year,424 they may conduct a less-intensive verifica-
tion in the second and third years after a positive full verification.425 A 
less-intensive verification involves conducting data checks but does not 
require a site visit or the preparation of a new sampling plan.426 
 Well-designed reporting rules and information systems are impor-
tant to lowering the government’s administrative costs. Regulatory 
agencies should require that compliance data and verification opinions 
be submitted in digital formats that facilitate governmental oversight 
and the provision of data to the public. For example, the ARB devel-
oped an “online greenhouse gas reporting tool” that both receives in-
formation from regulated entities and verifiers, and generates reports 
for the public.427 
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Conclusion 
 With third-party verification, important debates about the privati-
zation of governmental functions enter the sphere of regulatory im-
plementation and enforcement. Is determining regulatory compliance 
a core governmental function that should only be conducted by public 
servants, or can private actors possibly do a better job? 
 Many compelling reasons exist to endorse third-party verification. 
It follows in a long and often very successful tradition of public-private 
partnerships. Moreover, decades of the use of third parties in voluntary 
audits and certification schemes have given rise to a large industry of 
private inspectors and auditors that could be brought into the service 
of public regulation. Third-party verification holds the promise of more 
complete information about compliance and regulatory performance, 
which is particularly critical in the implementation of new regulatory 
frameworks. Finally, third-party verification is a way to shift part of the 
cost of social regulation to industry and conserve scarce governmental 
resources. 
 At the same time, however, there are also important reasons for 
concern. The assessment of regulatory compliance is arguably a core 
governmental function given how critical it is to ensure that laws are 
observed and public safety is protected. As this approach becomes part 
of regulatory frameworks, the legitimate interests of the public in the 
accountability of public and private actors, the independence and 
competence of verifiers, and the cost-effectiveness of the system must 
be adequately protected and promoted. 
 The foregoing analysis of third-party verification focuses on key 
questions of public-private governance that other scholars have posed: 
How can government draw on the strengths of the private sector in 
stimulating competition and innovation without sacrificing public val-
ues?428 How can government facilitate and direct a private role in pub-
lic governance?429 The answer lies in the establishment of clean and 
enforceable governmental rules that structure the public-private part-
nership. In the case of third-party verification, these rules should de-
termine which private parties may act as verifiers; how regulated enti-
ties select verifiers; how verifiers carry out their tasks to determine 
compliance; and which types of information must be publicly disclosed 
by private actors. Although the appropriate rules will differ depending 
on the public-private partnership under study, the lesson remains the 
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same. As privatization advances so too can—and should—the develop-
ment of rules that subject relevant private behavior to meaningful pub-
lic scrutiny and supervision. 
